

LAND, LABOUR AND CREDIT MARKET -

An Enquiry into their interlinking
in Five Bihar Villages.

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PREFACE

At the outset I wish to express my gratitude to the Indian Council of Social Science Research for funding this study. I am grateful to Professor Amiya K. Bagchi and Professor N. Krishnaji of the Centre for Social Science Research, Calcutta and Professors Krishna Bharadwaj of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, for their guidance at the various stages of this study.

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Usual absolution from the shortcomings of the study for those mentioned above is, of course, there.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

This study focuses on certain aspect of the inter-relationship of land, labour and credit market in a transitional society. We did not make the product market an object of our study as well (though we refer to it often indirectly) as because this market is complex enough to deserve separate treatment. It has been found that in these transitional societies the articulation of landowner, lessor and creditor in the person of ^{landowner} landlord enables the later to operate in all these markets simulataneously in such a manner that we can maximise his surplus. For examble, the dominant landholders, who is also usually a major source of credit in the village, may provide loans to the poor and the landless on condition that they provide underpaid and unpaid labour to him. In the lease market, again, as a major lessor, he (the landlord) leases out land on condition that the lessee works in his farm in wages lower than the market rates and also does other sundry works without any payment. The fact that often the lessee is also indebted to the landlords further makes his position difficult. As a result, we often find a situation where a dominant landholder, engaged in capitalist farming, leases out land in the lease market and appropriate rent. He may also found to be appropriating surplus in the form of usury in the loan market. Thus, the dominance of these landowners in the

lease and credit market not only enables him to appropriate surplus in these two markets in the form of rent and usury respectively but also provide him with cheap supply of labour for his farm. This articulation (in our case) of a dominant capitalist mode with pre-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation (e.g. absolute rent) is a feature of the transitional societies. In these societies the proverbial 'inevitable triumph' of the Capital has not taken place. In fact, in these societies, the Capital is found to be in various degrees of political compromise with these pre-capitalist elements. Under such a situation one can say that these pre-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation may act as condition for the dominant capitalist mode of production in agriculture.

This observation is made with the full knowledge that it raises many unresolved questions and, further, is the site of a major debate among the political economists in this country and outside. This study does not claim to provide, or even attempts to provide any final answer to some of the theoretical questions that the debate raises. Yet, these observations have been made in order to stress to the reader the point that this is the world view that the author has when he makes this sojourn to the study of the social formations of these five villages. In this sense it is basically an empirical study. The study is divided into four chapters. In the Chapter I, we have dealt with some theoretical concepts that underlie our discussion.

In Chapter II, we have discussed the characteristics of the land market trying to find out 'who are these labourers?; "are they capitalist farmers employing outside labour or feudal overlords?" A part of this chapter spills over to the Chapter III, also, where the characteristics of the attached labourers employed by these landowners have been discussed. In Chapter IV, we discussed the character of the lease market.

We have chosen three districts, Patna, Purnea and Madhubani on the basis of certain standard growth indices like cropping intensity and extent of assured water supply and also demographic criterion like presence (or absence) of large agricultural workers (Table 1-1). In terms of all the economic criteria Patna appeared to be the most advanced district and Madhubani the most backward. Purnea falls in between. Another point needs to be mentioned here : though relatively backward, Madhubani shows large presence of agricultural workers according to the 1971 Census.

After the selection of the districts the villages have been chosen randomly. We have selected two villages each from the three districts. Half-way through our investigation we had to drop one village in Purnea as we found that this village was adopted in the sixties by the land revenue department as model village for land reform. We could not substitute this village by another because of various constraints. The details about other five villages have been given below (Table 1-2). In

Biddhipur (Bakhtiarpur block) and Maina-Tanr (Bikram block) the level of irrigation is high. In Biddhipur about 56 per cent and in Maina-Tanr about 39 per cent of the cropped area are irrigated. In Biddhipur the main source of water supply is government tubewell and in Maina-Tanr the canal. On the other hand, in both Raghuni Dehat (Rajnagar block) and Baghnagri (Raik block) only 11 per cent and 22 per cent of the cropped area respectively are irrigated. In Raghuni Dehat the only source of irrigation is a private tank owned by the biggest landowner of the village. In Baghnagri the water is supplied by one government tubewell. In Dhima (Banmaukhi block, Purnea) 33 per cent of the cropped area is irrigated under the Kosi canal system. In Biddhipur the main crops are rice, wheat, chillies and tomato. In Maina-Tanr the main crops are rice and wheat. In Raghuni Dehat it is rice, wheat, sugarcane and 'pan' (betel) and in Baghnagri it is rice and wheat. In Dhima in Purnea the farmers grow mostly rice, wheat and jute. In all these villages the major landholders grow HYV wheat and rice for marketing. In this study we have, therefore, treated them as cash crop.

After the village selection we collected basic information about demography, land and major agricultural implements, e.g. tractor and pump, from all the households by administering a household schedule (See Schedule A in the Appendix). After this stage all the village households have been classified

according to land owned and their involvement in the lease market (i.e. whether they are lessor or lessee). Thereafter they have been sub-categorised as per their caste. Then from each of these villages we have taken 15 per cent of the total from each of these categories. Later we have administered three detailed schedule to collect data on production, land, lease and labour market (See Schedule B, C(i) and C(ii) in the Appendix).

In collecting these data we have combined both questionnaire method and observation method. We have spent about 15 months in these villages between March 1979 to March 1981. We stayed in all these villages from 4 to 5 months. During our stay in the village we tried to check as far as possible the information given by our interviews from various other sources. In many cases we tried to attend panchayat meeting etc. in the village. We also tried to present in the Khaliangs of the big landowners during the harvesting period (if we happened to be in the village during that period) and watched and interviewed both the land-owners and the tenants engaged in the process of sharing crops. In this our effort has often been thwarted by the disinclination of the landlords and the tenants to talk in the presence of each other. The tenants and agricultural labourers talked only in the seclusion of their thatched house and remain the most reliable source of our information about the village. But it must be added that our presence in the Khaliangs and village market and

watching these classes interact gave us many valuable insights into their relationships. In some cases we got cooperation from the landlords also.

At this stage it may be useful to point out the limitations of our data. For each of these five villages our information relate to a particular point of time. We have, therefore, to be confined to cross-sectional analysis pointing out changes in the relationship between classes in land, lease and labour markets as we move from relatively backward areas to relatively developed areas. Further, our information is affected by the local conditions. Because of these reasons we have not attempted any sophisticated statistical analysis and have presented the data in their simple bivariate relationship.

In each chapter we have followed a similar pattern of presentation. We have first briefly mentioned the basic concepts that underlie the discussion of that chapter. Then the analysis of the information follows and in the concluding stage we have tried to raise the basic issues without perhaps trying to answer them always. The presentation in the chapter reflects the manner of presentation in the study as well.

Table 1-1 : Basic Statistical Information About the Districts

		Patna	Purnea	Madhubani
1. Net area sown ('000 Ha.): 1974-75		232	483	236
2. Area sown more than once ('000 Ha.) : 1974-75		110	178	60
3. Cropped area ('000 Ha.) : 1974-75		342	661	296
4. Cropping intensity		147	136	80
5. Net area irrigated ('000 Ha.) 1974-75		151	52	22
Source-wise - Canal		49	30	9
Tanks		2	-	4
Tubewells		53	15	5
Other wells		2	2	-
Others		45	5	4
6. Total workers ('000 Nos.)	- 1961	716	864	588
	1971	668	938	575
7. Cultivators ('000 Nos.)	- 1961	261	411	255
	1971	218	409	223
8. Agricultural Workers ('000 Nos.)	- 1961	178	253	203
	1971	231	413	298
9. No. of holding ('000) - 1972-73		232	330	332
Percentage of the State total		3.1	4.4	4.4
Size of holding ('000 Ha.)		2.67	6.93	3.20
Percentage of the State total		2.3	6.0	2.8
Average size (Ha.)		1.2	2.1	1.0

Source : Bihar Through Figures and Annual Season and Crop Report, Various Issues, Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Bihar.

Table 1-2 : Basic Facts about the Villages

	Raghuni Dehat	Bagh- nagri	Dhima	Biddhi- pur	Maina Tanr
1. Cropped area (Acre)	880	670	1100	1600	510
2. Area irrigated (Acre) % to cropped area	100 11.4	150 22.4	360 32.7	900 56.3	300 58.8
3. Source of Irrigation	Private Tank	Govt. Tubewell	Canal/ Pri. well	Govt. Tubewell/ Canal	Canal/Pri. Tubewell
4. Crops grown*	Rice, Wheat, Sugar- cane, 'Fen'	Rice, Wheat	Rice, Jute, Wheat	Rice, Wheat, Tomato, Chilli- ies	Rice, Wheat
5. Distance from nearest metal road (kms.)	2	1/2	2	2	1
6. Distance from BDO (kms.)	30	9	2	12	4
7. Distance from district headquarter (kms.)	5	14	80	40	140
8. Whether the village has post office or not	Yes	No	No	No	No
9. Whether the village has cooperative socie- ties or not	Yes**	No	Yes**	Yes**	No
10. Main landlord Caste*	Maithil Brahmin/ Barai	Maithil Brahmin/ Yadav/ Barai	Rajput/ Maithil Brahmin	Bhumihar	Bhumihar

* Given in order of importance

** Indicates non-functioning. In Biddhipur out of two only one (milk cooperative) is functioning.

CHAPTER II

The Landowners : Who are They?

I

The first basis of modern land market in Bihar was laid down by the British land settlement and commercialisation and production condition that it evolved under the aegis of the British colonial power. It is not our purpose here to unravel this dialectical interaction. Our purpose here is to put down in bare outline the relevant aspects of this complex land relationship so that we can grasp the basic characteristics of major land holders of our regions of study.^{1/} The main purpose of the permanent settlement was to ensure revenue for the colonial state and to create an indigenous landlord class parasitic to the British capital.^{2/} At the same time the permanent settlement introduced bourgeois property rights in land. The Zamindars were given proprietary rights to their land subject to the payment of revenue. The ryots were allowed, legally at least, the rights to use the land provided they pay the rent. All these rights were made saleable. The two most important factors that actually caused

^{1/} We have used the term landholders/landlords/landowners synonymously to mean cultivators cultivating their own holdings either on their own or with the help of hired labour as distinguished from absentee landlords.

^{2/} See for a succinct enunciation of the zamindari and other system, see Patnaik, U., The Process of Commercialisation Under Colonial Conditions (paper presented in the Trivandrum seminar). We follow her arguments here.

large scale transfer of rights are the non-payment (or inability) to pay revenue^{3/} and non-payment of rent or more appropriately rackrenting. All these created land market and made land a safe security for credit. This is associated with increasing commercialisation particularly in the first half of the twentieth century; more areas were brought under cash crop, the productivity of both per man and per acre increased, the prices of crop and the land value increased. The trade in agricultural produce flourished.^{4/}

All these, in turn, encouraged sub-infeudation i.e. creation of multiple layers of intermediaries and also rack-renting. The Zamindars were content with renting out land and then exacting as much as they can from the actual cultivators so that they can have greater surplus after paying the revenue. These surplus were not reinvested in agriculture. The result was that the process of commercialisation that we saw in the permanent settlement area was not the rise of capitalism in agriculture as it happened in England. Instead, what we find is the commercialisation under the control of merchant capital which appropriated surplus in the process of circulation. The dominant conditions of production remained family based farming. This is our under-

3/ See Chaudhury, B., The Land Market in Eastern India, 1793-1940, The Indian Economic and Social History Review, pp.1-42 and pp.113-132, Vol.12, 1975. B. Chaudhury, however, deals only with the effect of land revenue on sale and purchase of proprietary rights in land.

4/ Ganguli, B.N., 'Trends in Population and Output in the Ganges Valley'; Dutt, R.C., Economic History of India, 2 Vols.; Choudhury, B., Growth of Commercial Agriculture in Bengal.

standing of the North Bihar social formation in the second half of this century. It is presented in a very schematic manner without going into the complex process which remained one of the major theme of discussion among the academics. Yet we present this general picture with the risk involved in such generalisation in order to point out that during this period two dominant classes emerged in North Bihar: the zamindars and a section of affluent occupancy ryot who cornered large chunks of land. (We are ignoring the traders' interest in land as our presumption is that the traders were not very prominent investors of capital in land in North Bihar.^{5/} This occupancy ryots were the actual cultivators and they combine in them both cultivators and moneylenders.^{6/} This class gained considerably from increasing agricultural growth and their increasing belligerency against the superior landowners enabled them to preserve their surplus.^{7/} The Bihar Land Reform Act, 1950, which earned its legal validity in 1952 after five years of judicial wrangling

5/ See Patnaik, U., op.cit., on this point

6/ See Bhaduri, A., 'Class Relations and Commercialisation in India Agriculture': A Study in Post-Independence Agrarian Reform of U.P.'; a paper presented in the Trivandrum seminar. See also Panchaspadan, J., "Local Leaders and the Intelligentsia in the Champaran Satyagraha", Contributions to Indian Sociology, New Series, No.8, November 1974.

7/ The literature on the rural protest in Bihar is voluminous. See Das, A.N. (ed.), Journal for Peasant Studies, Vol.9, No.3. Also see Choudhury, B.B., (1) The Process of Depeasantisation in Bengal and Bihar, 1885-1947, The Indian Historical Review Vol.2, No.1, New Delhi, July 1975. (2) Rural Credit Relations in Bengal, 1859-1885, The Indian Economic and Social History Reviews, pp.203-258, Vol.6, 1969. (3) "The Struggle for Produce Rent in Bihar", seminar at the ANS Institute of Social Studies, March 1976, Patna. (4) "Agrarian Unrest in Bengal and Bihar 1900-1946" in Nanda, R.R. (ed.) Socialism in India, New Delhi,

conferred on these ryots proprietary rights on their land and provided the juridical basis of today's big landowners of Bihar.^{8/}

In all the villages that we have studied the major landlords have more or less this origin. In Raghuni Dehat the Maithili brahmin family of Jorilal Jha owns about 140 acres. Their father Surilal Jha got some land as service tenure for rent collection from Raj Darbhanga and had also taken some land from Raj as occupancy ryot. He was also a moneylender. In 1945-50, Surilal Jha acquired land in this region. Then after the abolition of zamindari, he came to own his ryoti land. In the sixties this family acquired about 10 acres of land mortgaged to them by Rupal Safi, a Dhobi by caste. Rupan Safi is now landless.^{9/} The Jhas then bought about 2.46 acres in 1975 from Chalitra Safi, another Dhobi, now having only 0.9 acre. In 1978 Rajdeo Jha, a brahmin family now having 6.13 acres of land, sold .27 acre to Jorilal Jha, the eldest son of Surilal Jha, to pay off an old

FN 7 contd.

1972. (5) Agrarian Relations in Bengal After the Permanent Settlement 1793-1818 (unpublished D. Phil. dissertation in the Calcutta University, 1959). Das, A.N. Agrarian Unrest and Socio-Economic Change, 1900-1980, Manohar, 1983 and also his Report on Peasant Movement of Bihar in collaboration with Sengupta, M. For a different view point, see Stoke, E. The English Utilitarians and India, Oxford, 1983.

^{8/} The Bihar Land Reform Bill is known for its non-implementation. The ex-landlords succeeded to keep a large chunks of land in the name of self-cultivation and 'benami'. But it should also be noted that series of enactments have made the problem of managing these lands difficult. The land grab movement by various political parties have also made their positions difficult. In many cases these ex-zaminders are selling their land and investing their money in real estate or, in still limited cases, going for industrialisation, e.g. Hatwa Raj, Raj Darbhanga and Dumraon.

^{9/} Interview with Rupan Safi.

debt. (It should be noted that these information about land sale are not complete and, therefore, have used illustratively to point out the ways land has been acquired and from whom by the dominant landowners of this village).

The cousin brothers of Jorilal Jha - Shyam Jha and Deokio Jha and his brother Kamla Jha and Chandra Kant Jha - are all important cultivators of the village. Deokio Jha has about 30 acres of land; Kamla Jha about 12 acres and Chandra Jha about 10 acres. Their father Subidhlal Jha was also occupancy ryot of Raj Darbhanga. Among this brothers Deokio Jha gave the impression of a competent farmer and shrewd brain-trust of the Jhas in Raguni Dehat. In recent times Deokio added about 5 acres of land to his inherited holding. He bought them from Rupan Safi.^{10/}

The other cousin brother of Jorilal Jha, Shyam Jha become an orphan in 1949. He had only 16 acres^{11/} of land when he took charge of his property after gaining his adulthood. In recent times Shyam Jha has added about 12 acres to his holding : in 1977 he bought about 2.6 acres; in 1978, 6.3 acres and in 1979 another 3.6 acres.

^{10/} Rupan Safi had about 16 acres of land. He lost about 10 acres to Jorilal Jha and 5 acres to Deokio Jha all through mortgages.

^{11/} Shyam Jha gave us the following information about prices that he paid : for 2.6 acres of land bought in 1977 he paid Rs.6000; for 6.3 acres of land bought in 1978 he paid Rs.10000 and for another 3.6 acres he paid Rs.12000. Asked about the source of his fund, Shyam Jha informed us that this is his saving from agricultural income.

The other major community of landholders in Raghuni Dehat are the 'barais', a caste specialising in 'pan' cultivation which is consumed in large quantities by the Maithilis. Among the 'barais', the biggest landholders are Gudri Raut and Kapil Raut. (We found it difficult to communicate with both of them. We depended, therefore, mainly on their attached labourers for information about them). All the major 'barai' landholders are important monelenders of the village.

In 1949 Gundri Raut had about 50 acres of land. Since then he added another 25 acres of land to his holding mainly from surplus out of 'pan' cultivation and also through usury. Over last four years, i.e. between 1975 to 1976, he purchased about 6.33 acres of land. The details of that purchase is given below :

Table 2.1 : Land Purchased by Gudri Raut (1975-78)

Sellers' Name	Land (acre)	Land Sold (acre)	Year
1. Srikant Jha	3.6	.13	1975
2. Srikant Jha	3.6	.36	1975
3. Chulai Raut	.2	.12	1976
4. Srikant Jha	3.6	.09	1977
5. Srikant Jha	3.6	.12	1977
6. Amrit Paswan	.2	.21	1978
7. Suraj Shah	N.A.	1.23	1978
8. Rajdeo Jha	6.13	2.0	1978
9. Palai Raut	20.0	2.0	1978

Note : Like other landlords in Raghuni Dehat, Gudri Raut was reticent in giving information about land purchase. We collected these information mostly from his attached labourers and cross checked it from the sellers.

Kapil Raut was the other 'barai' landlord of the village. He has about 30 acres of land. He is the most important money-lender in the village. His investment in usury approximates Rs.50,000. He lends money mostly to the traders.

The biggest landlord of Baghnagri (Raika block in Madhubani), the Panjiars, have somewhat different origin. The Panjiars were traders by caste as well as by profession. In the thirties they were cloth merchants. When during the non-cooperation movement the business suffered losses, they moved to trading in agricultural produce. It is at this stage the father of the present Panjiars arrived in Baghnagri for buying 'pan' and other agricultural commodities. He also started advancing money to the cultivators. When in the late forties Raj Darbhanga began auctioning away land in this area, the Panjiars bought 50 acres of land in Baghnagri. Since then the Panjiars have extended their farm considerably. Their main acquisition has been from Bachcha Jha,^{12/} a brahmin landowner of the village. Bachcha Jha's uncle was Raj Darbhanga's retinue and got 45 acres of land as service tenure in this village. To meet social obligation this family borrowed Rs.5000 from the Panjiars and had to sell to the Panjiars 30 acres of land to square up the debt. Bachcha Jha has now only 5 acres of land.

^{12/} The family is deep in litigation. It sold 4 acres of land to pay court fees. The remaining land has been divided between Bachcha Jha and his cousin brothers. All of them are not economically well off now. The old hostility between Panjiar and this Jha family still persists in the form of political opposition. The Panjiar lead Congress (I) faction and Bachcha Jha leads the CPI faction in the village.

Next to the Panjiars, the other major landlord of the village was Harinarayan Yadav, a yadav by caste. As an agent of the present Panjiar's father, Amrit Yadav, the father of Hari Yadav, acquired 6 acres of land initially through mortgage. Subsequently Amrit Yadav was involved in a legal dispute with Lakshmi Jha over 30 acres of land. Amrit Yadav won the case and the land. In 1968 he bought about 5 acres of land from Madhuri Yadav of Baghnagri. At present Hari Yadav's landholding is about 42 acres.

The other landlords of the village are all Maithili brahmins. The biggest among them is Gangadhar Jha with 40 acres of land. Next in importance are Lakshmi Jha with 30 acres of land and Asarfi Jha with about 25 acres. All of them were ryots of Raj Darbhanga. Their new acquisition of land after that has not been much. On the other hand some of them have lost land; e.g. Lakshmi Jha has lost 30 acres to Amrit Jadav and Asarfi Jha about 7.1 acres to someone in village Dumri in 1964.

In Dhima (Barmankhi block, Purnea) the two principal landlord family - Biswan Singh and Kamal Singh - are Rajput by caste. The history of these two families are inter-connected, Kamal Singh's grand father, the late Rajkumar Singh, settled in this village as ryot, first, of Raj Darbhanga, and, later, of Champagnagar Estate around 1900 with about 300 acre of land. Biswan Singh's family was settled in Dhima around 1930 as retinue of

the Champanagar Estate. In course of time Biswan Singh acquired 150 acres of land mainly from Hari Singh, son of Rajkumar Singh and the father of Kamal Singh.^{13/} Biswanath Singh has more than 200 acres of land. Kamal Singh owns about 80 acres. Kamal Singh has proved to be the most efficient cultivator of the region and found to be very keen to take full advantage of the block agricultural extension services.

There are three other Rajput landlords in the village : one is Rames Singh who owns 60 acres; the other are Uchchan Singh with 20 acres and Randhir Singh with 15 acres. All these families were ryots of the Champanagar Estate. Rames Singh told us that since 1951 he has acquired 40 acres of land, part of which came from matrimonial connection (this part of his land is in other village) and part has been bought from money earned in jute trading.^{14/} Randhir Singh lost about 2.7 acres to his tenants.

In Dhima a yadav owner-tenant has recently merged as an

^{13/} According to Kamal Singh's version Biswan Singh acquired this land from his father Hari Singh not always through fair means. The villagers agreed by and large with Kamal Singh's account.

^{14/} In Dhima, and also in other villages, we found the big land-owners often going for occasional trading in crops. They hoard the grain for sometime and sell them when the price is high. In Dhima this practice among the big cultivators are more frequent as the village is only 4 kms. away from Ban-mankhi market which is one of the biggest trading centre for agricultural produce. For example, Kamal Singh informed us that in 1980 he earned Rs.6000 by trading in 'tisi', an oilseed. It is very difficult to estimate definitely how they use the fund. Usually a part of it is invested in building etc., either in the village or in the nearby district town, and part is used for buying land.

important tenant-cultivator. He has about 16 acres of land including leased in land. In 1976 he bought 4.5 acres of land; in 1979 about 1.8 acres and in 1980 about 1.3 acres. Ramdeo Yadav works in the Barmaukhi Market Yard, which seems to have given him enough liquidity to buy these lands.

The other person who has grown in importance in Dhima is Nab Jha, a Maithili brahmin. In 1955 he had only 4 acres of land and had another 3 or 4 acres under sharecropping. He added 6 acres to his original holding since then. As Congress(I) nominee he has become mukhiya of the Dhima panchayat. He has political ambition and boasts his close association with the present Bihar Chief Minister. He works as manager in the local cattle market in Barmaukhi and does work as contractor for the government. We were told that he bought land from the money earned as manager and as contractor.

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In Dhima there are three bania families who combine business with cultivation. The biggest among them is Premlal owning 25 acres. He is a 'fadia' and also has a flour mill and a medical store in Barmaukhi. Premlal told us that between 1971 and 1981 he bought 8 acres of land. The two other bania families of Dhima are Vaidhynath and Jharilal who are related to Premlal. Like the later, they two combine grain trading with cultivation. Vaidyanath has about 11 acres of land and Jharilal about 10 acres.

our land market. We, therefore, use this data illustratively to point out certain aspects of the process of land concentration in these villages. All the big landowners in these villages were either occupancy ryots or holders of service tenure or both in the erstwhile zamindari period. They were real possessors and cultivators of land. Only exception was the Panjiars of Baghaagri (Block Asika, District Madhubani) whose initial accumulation came from trade and usury, which was later used for easy purchase of land. Further, the Panjiars were basically absentee landlords till 1979, when the 'Bataidari Movement' launched by the CPI made him shift to the village and took up cultivation directly.^{15/} All these landowners got title to their land after the Bihar Land Reforms Act of 1952. In the post-reform period also most of these landlords have bought land. In many cases they acquired land which was already mortgaged to them. All these big landowners have, therefore, acquired land by three main ways : (a) through legal enactments, (b) through mortgage and (c) outright purchase.^{16/} In the post-reform period the later two sources are the main process of land acquisition. It is very difficult to find out which one of these two sources are important because of the difficulty of collecting information about sources of land trans-

^{15/} During our field trip we found that the Panjiars do not stay in the village. They visit the village from his Madhubani home every alternate day to supervise his farm. This, he said, he started doing after the 'bataidars' agitation.

^{16/} Another source of acquiring land is the illegal occupation of 'Gairmamura Am' (the government land) and 'Gairmamura khas' (usually the land in excess of ceiling under the government's possession). In all the five villages we were told that all the major landowners have grabbed such land. We found it very difficult to accurately estimate the extent of such grabbing, however.

action. Further, in many cases such distinction may be unreal e.g., in many cases a poor peasant may be forced to sell a good unmortgaged piece of land cheaply to a landlord only because he has sizeable chunks of other lands mortgaged to him (the landlord) or is otherwise heavily indebted to him. However, in our villages we found a class of landowners who have used mainly surplus funds accumulated from agricultural operations or from other non-agricultural sources like service etc. for outright purchase of free land. These landowners are usually in the category of 10 to 40 acres of land, e.g. :

1. Shyam Jha (village : Raghuni Dehat) has 30 acres. His main source of fund is agriculture.
2. Lakshmi Jha (village : Baghnagri) has 30 acres. Though initially he lost 30 acres of land in litigation, he bought a few acres in recent times from money earned by his brothers who are in services.
3. Kamal Singh (village : Dhima) has 80 acres. He bought 2 acres in 1979 from money earned by selling 'jate' and 'tisi' (an oilseed).
4. Ramdeo Yadav (village : Dhima) has 16 acres of operational holding. Between 1976 and 1980 he bought 7.6 acres of land through money earned as an employee in the Barmankhi Market Yard.
5. Nab Jha (village : Dhima), the mukhiya, has 10 acres. In recent times he added 6 acres from his earning as manager of a local private hat of Maul Babu, an ex-zamindar of Purnea.

An important aspect of these categories of landowners is that they are very keen cultivators and have accepted various agricultural extention programme of the government successfully.

But who are these landowners? Are they capitalist farmers or feudal landowners? In analysing the characteristics we follow

the Marxist method of analysing the modus of production organisation. Any production organisation involves the organisation of direct producers, means of production and non-labour class. The way these are organised determine the character of any mode of production. In an pre-capitalist form the direct producers owns his means of production. In the capitalist mode of production there is separation of direct producers from their means of production which come to owned by their employer class.

In the pages that followed we adopt the following analytical scheme. In the first chapter we discussed the ownership pattern of instruments of production such as :

1. Land
2. Implements
3. Livestock
4. Seeds and Fertiliser
5. Irrigation

In the next chapter (Chapter III) we discuss the extent of employment of outside labour with special reference to attached labour and how it affects the wages of casual labour. In Chapter IV, we deal with the tenancy market.

1. Land

Our problematic here ^{is} into find out whether the ownership of land, the most important instrument of production in agriculture, acts as primary accumulation. This problematic has relevance to the North Bihar social formation where the ownership of land gives immense initial resource advantage to its owners at the economic

level (e.g. as security to bank loan). It also gives its owners social and political status (as members of cooperatives or members of panchayat, etc.) which enables them to argument their economic resources.^{17/}

The distributions of land ownership, both reported and estimated, have been given below (Table 2.2 and 2.3) along with their cumulative distributions (Table 2.4 and 2.5) and also their graphs (at the end of the chapter). The land data have been collected through a household schedule, which was then cross-checked from other sources like farm labourers and other persons working in the concerned landholder's household and also from the village officials. The information collected during the crosschecking formed the basis of our estimation of landholding pattern which shows higher degree of land concentration. Of course, the possibilities of error exists in our estimation also. The information given by these farm labourers and others about their landlords and employers are usually influenced by their personal relationship with the later. We tried to reduce this error by checking the figures given by these farm labourers and others with the village officials like gramsevak and karmachari. These sources itself are not without errors. These village officials are usually dependent on the landlords. In fact,

^{17/} The cooperatives and panchayati in our villages are all dominated by the big landowners. In fact, these two organisations have become to these classes an important institution to argument their own economic and political games. The practice of nomination of 'representatives' from the poor sections have not changed the situation as the big landlords still control them. See later on this point.

Table 2.2 : Estimated Distribution of Land Owned

Land Owned (Acre)	Rajmuni Dehat		Baghnagri		Dhima		Maina Tanr		Biodhipur	
	House- hold (No.)	Area (Acre)	House- hold (No.)	Area (Acre)	House- hold (No.)	Area (Acre)	House- hold (No.)	Area (Acre)	House- hold (No.)	Area (Acre)
1. Landless	4	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	3	-
2. Below 2.5	16	3.25	14	8.6	12	15.73	7	2.28	17	15.41
3. 2.5 - 5.0	2	8.77	-	-	5	16.5	2	7.83	8	25.15
4. 5.0 - 7.5	4	23.05	2	11.36	8	11.13	2	11.96	1	5.4
5. 7.5 - 10.0	1	8.64	-	-	1	9.73	-	-	3	25.38
6. 10.0 - 20.0	-	-	2	24.53	3	42.0	-	-	1	10.00
7. 20.0 - 40.0	3	100.84	2	58.53	-	-	1	32.97	3	89.59
8. 40.0 - 60.0	-	-	1	41.05	1	47.0	3	136.03	1	45.91
9. 60.0 +	2	242.38	1	125.0	3	376.0	1	113.45	1	72.91
10. Total	32	386.93	22	269.07	43	519.09	16	304.52	38	289.46

Table 2.3 : Distribution of Land Owned (Reported)

Land Owned (Acre)	Land Distribution in							
	Rachuni Dehat		Baghnagri		Dhime		Maina Tanr	
	House- hold (No.)	Area (Acre)	House- hold (No.)	Area (Acre)	House- hold (No.)	Area (Acre)	House- hold (No.)	Area (Acre)
1. Landless	11	.16	5	.5	17	-	3	.15
2. Below 2.5	9	3.01	3	9.57	11	9.64	4	2.33
3. 2.5 - 5.0	3	13.72	1	3.44	5	16.65	2	7.93
4. 5.0 - 7.5	3	17.09	2	11.37	2	12.13	2	11.93
5. 7.5 - 10.0	1	8.64	-	-	1	9.73	-	-
6. 10.0 - 20.0	2	36.00	2	24.53	3	49.00	2	23.48
7. 20.0 - 40.0	2	60.00	2	50.52	1	22.00	3	126.45
8. 40.0 - 60.0	-	-	1	41.05	-	-	-	-
9. 60.0 +	1	74.00	1	90.00	3	243.0	-	-
10. Total	32	212.62	22	237.98	43	361.16	16	172.33
							38	162.57

* See the body of the paper for the discussion on the method of data collection and estimation.

Table 2.4 : Cumulative Distribution of Land Owned (Estimated) (Percentage)

[illegible]

Table 1.5 : Cumulative Distribution of Land Owned (Reported)
(Percentage)

[illegible]

except in Dhima (Purnea) and Maina Tanr (Patna), we found the offices of these village officials are situated in the landlords premises and these officials themselves are staying and taking their food with the landlords' family. This affects their independent functioning. The fact that these landlords usually have political links directly as mukhiya etc. (e.g., in Dhima and Maina Tanr) or indirectly through familial and other social links like caste etc. (e.g. in Baghnagri and Raghuni Dehat) makes the task of these village officials more difficult. In spite of these possibilities of error we think that our estimation is closer to the reality because of three factors : first, the landowners in North Bihar are well known for underreporting their landholding mainly due to various legislations restricting the size of landholding. This tendency we found among all the landlords in the five villages we worked. Second, the implementation of land reform legislations has hardly been effective in this region.^{18/} Third, the village records tend to under-report the size of landholdings of the bigger landlords because of multifarious links that the lower level functionaries have with these landowning class. (The situation in this regard in our villages has already been described above). In view of all these it is likely that our estimation of landholding pattern which shows greater concentration than that given by the landlords and official records are closer to the reality.

^{18/} See for example, Janmazi, F.T., Agrarian Crisis in India, Sangam Books.

From our estimation of landholding pattern the following facts could be pointed out. (a) In all the villages the landholding pattern shows high degree of concentration. But this concentration is relatively more in Raghuni Dehat and Baghnagri, both in Madhubani and in Dhima in Purnea which are traditional areas of landlordism in North Bihar. Compared to Madhubani and Purnea, the Patna district has seen smaller landlords and has also experienced the impact of agricultural development relatively earlier. In Raghuni Dehat 84 per cent of the household has only 11 per cent of the total land. For Baghnagri these figures are 74 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. And for Dhima they are 84 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. In Maina Tanr, on the other hand, 69 per cent of the household has 7 per cent of the total land area in acre, while the respective figures for Siddhipur are 84 per cent and 25 per cent. Second, the number of landless and those having land-less than 2.5 acres are also high in Raghuni Dehat and Baghnagri (both of Madhubani) and in Dhima (Purnea) than in Maina Tanr and Siddhipur (both of Patna). Their percentage figures are 63 per cent, 64 per cent, 65 per cent respectively for the first three villages and 44 per cent and 53 per cent respectively for the later two villages. The percentage of the total area held by this class in each of these villages are .84 per cent, 3.2 per cent, 3 per cent, .75 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. The other thing to be noted that the number of completely landless does not exist in Baghnagri and Maina Tanr and exists in relatively few in number in Raghuni Dehat (13 per cent) and in Siddhipur (8

per cent). Only in Dhima (Purnea) it constitutes 37 per cent of the total households. Third, the average size of landholding of the three classes show wide disparities in all the villages. Between the villages, however, the average holding size of landless are relatively smaller in Raghuni Dehat, Baghnagri and Dhima. (0.68 per cent, 0.61 per cent and 0.98 per cent respectively) - which falls within the traditional zone of landlordism - than that in Maina Tanr and Biddhipur (1.12 per cent and 1.89 respectively). The average holding size of the middle peasants are more or less same in all the five villages - between 6 to 7 per cent.

2. Agricultural Implements

The distribution of agricultural implements have been given in table 2.6 and per household distribution of plough and minor implements like 'kudal' etc. have been given in table 2.7. In these two tables the households have been divided into three categories of small, middle and big peasants on the basis of their land size. The cut off points have been chosen somewhat arbitrarily. We have put together all peasant household households who have then five acres or less land and also those without land into one category of small peasants as these classes are the main repository of labour power in the villages and, further, they are more or less equally off in terms of ownership of agricultural implements. In Dhima (Purnea), Maina-Tanr and Biddhipur (both in Patna), which falls within agriculturally advanced area,

Table 2.6 : Agricultural Implements (No.)

Agricultural Implements	Village	Raghuni Dehat	Bagh-nagri	Dhima	Maina Tanr	Biddhipur
1. Plough						
Small Peasant (Below 5.0)		12	14	31	4	18
Middle Peasant (5.0-10.0)		-	1	11	9	14
Big Peasant (10.0 +)		21	20	17	14	16
2. Cart						
Small Peasant		3*	2	1	-	4
Middle Peasant		-	-	3	1	3
Big Peasant		5*	5	1	-	3
3. Tractor						
Small Peasant		-	-	-	-	-
Middle Peasant		-	-	-	-	-
Big Peasant		-	-	5	1	2
4. Pumpset						
Small Peasant		-	-	2	1	1
Middle Peasant		-	-	2	2	1
Big Peasant		2	2	6	3	4
5. Minor Implements						
'Kudal'						
Small Peasant		15	18	17	6	9
Middle Peasant		-	3	8	10	8
Big Peasant		13	10	25	11	20
'Khurpi'						
Small Peasant		30	36	34	9	19
Middle Peasant		-	3	9	22	16
Big Peasant		26	20	30	22	34
'Hasua'						
Small Peasant		22	38	27	13	14
Middle Peasant		-	4	8	18	14
Big Peasant		10	14	27	18	25
6. Other						
Small Peasant		-	-	2	-	1
Middle Peasant		-	-	8	2	-
Big Peasant		2	-	5	1	2
7. N :						
Small Peasant		22	14	33	9	23
Middle Peasant		-	1	3	2	4
Big Peasant		4	5	6	3	4

* Indicate tyre cart

Table 2.7 : Selected Agricultural Implements per Household

	(no. per household)				
	Raghuni Dehat	Bagh- nagri	Dhima	Maina Tanr	Biddhipur
1. Plough					
Small Peasant (Below 5.0)	.6	1	9	.4	.8
Middle Peasant (5.0 -10.0)	-	1	3.7	4.5	3.5
Big Peasant (10.0+)	5.3	4	2.8	4.7	4
2. Minor Implements					
'Kudal'					
Small Peasant	.8	1.3	.52	.9	.4
Middle Peasant	-	3	2.7	5	2
Big Peasant	3.3	2	4.2	3.7	5
'Khurpi'					
Small Peasant	1.5	2.6	1	1	.82
Middle Peasant	-	3	3	11	4
Big Peasant	6.5	4	5	7.3	8.5
'Masua'					
Small Peasant	1.1	2.7	.8	1.4	.6
Middle Peasant	-	4	2.7	9	3.5
Big Peasant	2.5	2.8	4.5	6	6.3

the tractors have come (Table 2.7). Out of eight tractors in these three villages five are in Dhima (Purnea) and one in Maina Tanr and two in Biddhipur. All these tractors are owned by big peasants. The Madhubani villages of Raghuni Dehat and Baghnagri each have two pumpsets owned by the big peasants. The other three villages have the remaining 22 pumpsets. In Dhima, out of 10 pumpsets the big peasants have 6, the middle peasants 2 and the small peasants 2. Out of 6 pumpsets in Maina Tanr, the big peasants have 3, the middle peasants 2 and the poor peasants 1.

Out of 6 again in Biddhipur, the big peasants have 4 and the middle and small have 1 each. Two factors seems to explain this distribution pattern of pumpsets : (a) the concentration of pumpsets are to be found mostly in villages which fall within the irrigation zones and where the groundwater level is high. This is the case with Dhima (Purnea), which falls within Kosi irrigation system and also Maina Tanr (Patna) which is within the Sone Canal system. Biddhipur is irrigated by government tubewells. But its nearness to the Ganges has raised its water-level which enables the peasants to use pumpsets to extract groundwater. In Raghuni Bhat, on the other hand, the only source of water is a big tank which is in possession of the biggest landowners of the village. The two pumpsets owned by two landowners of the village are used by them to lift waters from the tank. Like Biddhipur, Baghnagri is also irrigated by government tubewells and the landowners usually use the pumps to irrigate their land which falls beyond the area served by the tubewells. (b) The small peasants of Dhima, Maina-Tanr and Biddhipur got their pumpset from the government at subsidised rates. This did not have any impact on their economic position. In Dhima, for example the government gave all the displaced person settled here from (erstwhile East Pakistan) 3 acres of land, cheap loans and pumpsets. We found that none of these farmers have been able to use these subsidies for their

own agricultural promotion. Instead, they have used up the loans, sold their pumpsets to the big farmers and taken to wage labour to supplement their income from their farm. The renting of pumpsets is also an important source of income for some of these farmers.

In case of other implements like plough, 'kudal' 'khurpi' and 'hasua', the big landowners are generally better off than the small and the middle landowners (Table 2.7). Only in Dhima the big peasants have lesser number of plough per household than the middle peasants. This is largely due to the use of tractors by the big peasants in Dhima. In Maina Tanr and Biddhipur where too some of the big peasants have tractors, the number of plough per big peasant households are only marginally higher than the middle peasants. The number of ploughs per big peasants household are 4.7 and 4 respectively in Maina Tanr and Biddhipur respectively. The middle peasants, on the other hand, have 4.5 and 3.5 number of ploughs per household in Maina Tanr and Biddhipur respectively. The small peasants are badly off in this respect in all the villages. In case of minor implements again the disparity between big peasants and middle peasants, on the one hand, and the small peasants, on the other, are very high in all the villages (Table 2.7). In Baghnagri the per household ownership of 'kudal' and 'hasua' by the big peasants are 2 and 2.8 respectively in comparison to 3 and 4 respectively owned by every middle peasant household.

3. Livestock

The distribution of livestock has been given in table 2.8. It gives the distribution of bullocks, cows, buffaloes and others. The bullock power is the most important factor in cultivation. We have given the per household distribution of bullocks in table 2.9 below.

Table 2.8 : Livestock

		(No. per household)				
		Raghuni Dehat	Ragh- nagri	Dhima	Maina Tanr	Biddhipur
1. <u>Bullock</u>						
Small Peasant	(Below 5.0)	10	10	20	6	21
Middle Peasant	(5.0 - 10.0)	-	4	9	7	15
Big Peasant	(10.0+)	46	44	44	37	46
2. <u>Cow</u>						
Small Peasant*		3(1)	14	3(1)	2	-
Middle Peasant		-	2	3(1)	5(2)	8(4)
Big Peasant		5(1)	7	15(7)	9	6(3)
3. <u>She-buffaloes</u>						
Small Peasant*		7	12	4(1)	2	6
Middle Peasant		-	1	-	4	6
Big Peasant		8(11)	8	14(9)	4	6(1)
4. <u>Others</u>						
Small Peasant*		-	3	2	4	4
Middle Peasant		-	-	-	-	-
Big Peasant		-	1	20	-	4
5. <u>N</u>						
Small Peasant*		22	14	28	9	23
Middle Peasant		-	2	3	2	4
Big Peasant		4	5	6	7	6

* Includes landless. Figures in brackets indicate calf.

Table 2.9 : Bullock Per Household

Land Owned (Acre)	(No. per household)				
	Raghuni Dehat	Baghnagri	Dhima	Maina Tanr	Biddhipur
Small Peasant (Below 5.0)	45	.71	.71	.66	.91
Middle Peasant (5.0 - 10.0)	-	2	3	3.5	3.7
Big Peasant (10.0 +)	11.5	7.3	7.3	5.2	7.6

The distribution is highly uneven. The small peasants do not have even a pair of bullock per household without which is cultivation work is not possible.

This pattern of ownership of bullocks and plough, the two most important conditions of agricultural production, has perpetuated certain types of labourer payment system in these villages :

a) In Raghuni Dehat we found in vogue 'Sabtaithi' system.

This system has the following rates of payment through labour :

- i. When an agricultural labour hires one bullock or plough for use in his leased land from a small land peasant, he has to work one day in the poor peasants land; i.e. the rate of exchange is 1:1. Similar is the rate when he hires from another agricultural labour.
- ii. When a poor peasant hires bullock or plough from another small peasant, the rate of exchange is again the same i.e. one days labour in the owner's land for one day's hire of his bullock or plough.

- iii. When a poor peasant or a landless borrows plough or bullock for a day from a middle peasant or a big peasant, the poor peasant and landless has to work 2 days in the land of middle peasant or big peasants.

This type of payment through labour could be found in Siddhipur, Dhima and Maina Tanr also which are relatively developed and fall within irrigated zone.

- b) The middle peasants, and also poor peasants, in all these villages resort to another kind of 'Subtaithi' system wherein one having one ox borrows another ox from the other, also having one ox, for a day and in return lends his own ox to the later for a day. The item exchanged could be anything, but the rates of exchange are usually 1:1. This system could be found in all the villages.

Side by side with this kind of exchange one could find other types where the borrowing peasants pay by kind or money for making use of others plough, ox, etc. The exchange rates varies from village to village and also between classes within a village :

- a) For example, there is a system of payment called Muabia.

Here the rates are :

- i. For a day's hire of two bullocks and one plough from a big or middle peasant, a poor peasant or landless will have to pay Rs.5 or Rs.6 during sowing season.
- ii. In a similar situation a middle peasant will pay most probably Rs.3.50 or Rs.4.00.

b) In 'Manhunda', on the other hand, for use of one bullock for one whole cultivation season, the user is required to pay 1.12 quintal of grains to the owner. (This rate is extremely variable depending on 'who lends to whom').

4. Seeds and Fertiliser

We have given here actual quantity of seeds and fertiliser used per household by different classes combined in table 2.10. In the 'NR' indicates those big peasants who have refused information. In case of middle peasants and small peasants it indicates those in our sample who does not use HYV seed and fertiliser. It should be pointed out here that in many cases the middle peasants (and also large section of small peasants) take seeds and fertilisers as loans from the big peasants and pay interest for that (usually 50 per cent). Otherwise our data show that the use of improved seeds and fertilisers are fairly widespread. It is used by all classes though its use by big peasants are much more than that of the middle and small. We have not tried to calculate per acre use of these inputs as that could be misleading. In fact, per acre use of these inputs by the two lower categories of farmers would be much higher than the big ones because of their size of holding. This also does not take into account loan element in this input use by the small and middle ones. In most cases they borrow these input from the big peasants at the rate of 50 per cent ('deora', as it is loca-

lly known) per annum or even 50 per cent per cultivation season in some cases, which makes the yearly rate 100 per cent.

Table 2.10 : Use of Seeds and Fertiliser in Some Selected Crops (Combined)

Land Owned (Acre)	(Quintal per household)			
	Fertilizer		HYV Seed	
	Rice	Wheat	Rice	Wheat
1. Small Peasant (Below 5.0)	.54	.2	.47	.23
N -	10	11	10	9
NR -	96	95	96	97
2. Middle Peasant (5.0 - 10.0)	1.55	1.71	.61	.33
N -	11	11	10	9
NR -	5	5	6	7
3. Big Peasant (10.0+)	5.9	5.29	4.82	8.6
N -	24	24	21	24
NR -	5	5	8	-

NR - Non-reporting. See the body of the report for further explanation.

5. Irrigation

The extent of irrigation - source-wise for five villages separately - have been given in table 2.11. The only source of irrigation in Raghuni Dehat is a private tank, owned by the biggest landlord of the village. Baghnagri has one government tubewell which irrigated 100 to 125 acres. Biddhipur has the service of two government tubewells which irrigated about 250 acres. A part of the cultivable land in Biddhipur is served by

Table 2.11 : Area Irrigated (Source-wise) (Average Acre)

Land Owned (Acre)	Raghuni Dehat	Baghnagri	Dhima		Maina Tanr	Biddhipur	
	Private Tank	Govt. Tube-well	Canal	Pri. Pump-set	Canal	Govt. Tube-well	Canal
1. Small Peasant (Below 5.0)	-	-	.7	-	3.1	2.49	-
N	22	14	33	-	9	-	-
2. Middle Peasant (50.0 - 10.0)	.31	1.65	6.0	-	4.5	6.3	-
N	5	2	3	-	2	4	-
3. Big Peasant (10.0 +)	5.17	10.75	13.81	.7	31.38	15.8	1.56
N	5	6	7	-	5	6	-

a canal originating from the Ganges. Dhima and Maina Tanr, on the other hand, is primarily irrigated by the canal : Dhima by the Kosi canal system and Maina Tanr by Sone canal system. The groundwater level of the three villages - Biddhipur, Dhima and Maina Tanr - are high as they fall within the command area of three major rivers - the Ganges, Kosi and Sone respectively. As a result, the peasants in this villages, particularly the bigger ones, make use of pumpset to lift underground water. Baghnagri, Dhima, Maina Tanr and Biddhipur are better irrigated than Raghuni Dehat. Within these villages, however, there is wide disparity between classes. In Baghnagri the average area irrigated per big peasant household is 11 acre compared to 2

acres for the middle peasant household. The small peasants have no irrigation. In Dhima also, one witness such disparities. The acre irrigated per big peasants in Dhima is 14 through canal and another .7 acre through private pump, while the middle peasants have 6 irrigated acre per household and the small peasants only .7 acre. In Maina Tanr, the big peasants have 31 acres irrigated area per household, the respective figures for middle and small peasants are 5 acres and 3 acres. In Biddhipur the average irrigated area per big peasant household is 17 acres, including 1.56 acre irrigated through pumpset. The middle peasants and the small peasants have 6 acres and 2 acres respectively. The big peasants of Maina Tanr have greater per household irrigated area than their counterpart in other villages. The big peasants of Raghuni Dehat are least endowed in this respect. They have only 5 irrigated acres per household which is much less than what the big peasants of other villages have per household. The middle peasants of Raghuni Dehat have only .31 acre per household which is again much less than the per household acre owned by their counterpart in other villages.

Thus the irrigation is largely the monopoly of big peasants. Like land, the monopoly of this important conditions of production enables ^{these} big peasants not only to organise their own production on modern lines, it also enables them to affect the organisation of production of other classes. One has to listen to Ramji Singh, a 4 acre landowners of Biddhipur in Patna district to understand this :

" . . . My land falls within the irrigated area of the village. But we do not get water in time. It is those who are near to the tubewell get water first. We get water after them. And when they take away the entire water we do not get anything. In that case we have to depend on water from private sources".

In Biddhipur the private rate for water supply is Rs.100 per 'bigha' when the official rate for tubewell water in Biddhipur is Rs.41 per 'bigha'.^{19/} The refrain of Ramji Yadav could be heard in other villages. In order to appreciate fully what happens to persons like Yadav and their ilk, one needs to look into the following facts :

- a) In Raghuni Dehat the land around the tank - the only source of water in the village - is owned by the big landowners. This enables ^{them} to keep control over water. They always take the water first. When in 1976, the poor peasants, agricultural labourers and sharecroppers of the village demanded minimum wages and better deals in sharing of crops, the big landowners of the village used this control over the tank water to bring those intransigent to book. The latter was not only denied irrigation

^{19/} A local measurement. In standard acre it comes to .63 acre.

water but also were prevented from using the water for household purposes.^{20/}

- B) In Baghnagri (district Madhubani) the government has dug the tubewell on the land given by the Panjiars owing 125 acres and the tubewell operator is a family member of Lakshmi Jha, owning 35 acres. The land around the tubewell belong to the landlord. So the relationship with these landholders is the determining factor in getting water in Baghnagri.
- c) In Biddhipur during our field trip in December 1980, we found that both the tubewells are out of order. During our stay in the village one tubewell was repaired. But since this tubewell is away from Mukhiya land, the later stayed the functioning of this tubewell by bringing an injunction from the court to the effect that the operator of this tubewell has broken some parts of the other tubewell deliberately in order to keep it out of order and this hamper his (Mukhiya) agricultural work. After five days the injunction was vacated without any objection from Mukhiya as by that time the other tubewell was repaired.

^{20/} During our field trip 1979-80, we found that a case is pending in Madhubani court where Jagdish Safi, etc., all sharecroppers and poor peasants of Raghuni Dehat, have complained that, among others, they have been prevented from using the pond by Kapil Raut and other landlords of the village.

These are few examples to show how the control of water has been used. In some cases the landowners have fought among themselves for the control of water. But in most case it is the poor peasants and sharecroppers who have been adversely affected. Often they have been compelled to buy water at higher rates from the private sources. The sharecroppers have been forced to pay half of this high water cost. When they have failed to pay it, it has been treated as loan with interest.

Conclusions

From the above discussions we can made the following observations : (a) the concentration of land is extremely high. By using our data illustratively we have also shown how changes in super-structure - the land laws - and usury has helped the process of concentration of land. (b) We have also shown how the monopoly of land, this most important conditions of production, is associated with the control of other productive forces like seed, fertiliser and water.

II

The Landlords and the Moneylenders

In table 2.12 we give the inter-connection between the landowners and moneylending. The collection of information on moneylending has its own problems. Due to anti-moneylending legislation

the landowners are wary about giving any information about money lending. We first collected the list of licensed moneylenders from the block office and then interviewed the persons in the village. All the big landowners in the village does moneylending. In Raghuni Dehat Jorilal Jha's (150 acres) one brother has money-lending business in Jamshedpur. In this village also he has extensive moneylending business. Gudri Raut (75 acres) has similar transaction in the village as well as outside the village. Kapil Raut also has usurious transactions. Both these two Rauts lend money to the local traders. In Baghnagri, the Fanjiars are also engaged in such activities in Madhubani town. They also give money to the traders. In Dhima, Biswan Singh's brother lends money to the traders and shopkeepers of Barmankhi. They also have extensive moneylending business in the village. The Mukhiya of Siddhipur (110 acres) and K. Singh and Sadhu Singh in Maina Tanr are similarly involved in moneylending. In a few cases the small and the middle landowners too are moneylenders (Table 2.12). The table includes those landowners who have money lending licence. In most cases only a few landowners have licence though all of them lend money to their tenants, labourers and other peasants. The purpose of lending is determined by the necessity of the debtors. They need money primarily for their consumption purposes. Sometimes they also need it for social functions, or still less, for seeds and fertilisers. These loans, which are usually petty in amount, serves these purpose.

Table 2.12 : Landowners Engaged in Moneylending

Area Owned (Acre)	No. of House- hold Reporting	No. Engaged in Moneylending
1. Below 2.5	68	10
2. 2.5 - 5.0	4	3
3. 5.0 - 10.0	8	N11
4. 10.0 +	28	37*

* Number of moneylenders are more than the number of households as here we have counted the number of licences in each household.

For the landowners too these loans serves important productive purposes. Not only do they enables them to appropriate surplus in the form of interest, it also help reproduction of these poor peasants, tenants and labourers often rolled into one. It is very important to understand the role of usury from this point of view. Commenting of such roles of usury in every mode of production, in his Capital, Volume 3, Marx said :

Usury has a revolutionary effect in all pre-capitalist modes of production and dissolves those forms of property. Only when and where the other pre-requisites of a capitalist production are present does usury becomes one of the means assisting in establishment of the new mode of production mining feudal lords and small-scale producer, on the one hand, and centralising the conditions of labour into capital, on the other. (Emphasis added) (Marx, 1962 : III, 583-584).

On its own, therefore, the usury cannot provide sufficient condition for establishing any mode of production. It can destroy pre-capitalist modes. And, where the capitalist modes of production has been established, it helps in concentrating the conditions of production in the hands of a few non-labour. And, further, as we are arguing here, in a transitional society, it could be an useful means for cheaper labour supply and to ensure lessors' rent.

III

Besides moneylending, these labourers usually have direct or indirect links with trading and other sectors of the economy. Though this does not constitute the direct focus of our subject, we think it would be worthwhile to note broadly the nature of these links. In Table 2.13 we give the non-agricultural occupations of big peasants. The big peasants are involved in grain trading in a significant way. This interlinking follows certain distinct pattern. Except in three cases - two in Dhima and one in Biddhipur- they hardly have identifiable business set-up. Usually the practice is to buy grains from the villages from his own village as well as neighbour's during the post-harvest period and then sell it to a particular grain dealer, or dealers, with whom they have long business relation. In some cases the peasants hoard the grain in his 'khalian' in order to deliver to the

Table 2.13 : Non-Agricultural Occupation of Big Peasants Household^{1/}

Land Owned (Acre)	Grain Trade	Other Petty business ^{2/}	(No.)			
			Service	Teaching	Caste Profe- ssion	Others
10.0 - 20.0	2	Nil	4	4	Nil	1
20.0 - 40.0	5	2	6	1	1	1
40.0 - 60.0	7	2	7	6	1	Nil
60.0 +	5	6	9	3	Nil	Nil
Total	19	10	26	14	2	2

^{1/} Does not include moneylending. For that see Table 2.12.

^{2/} Includes contract work, transport, business, flour mill, etc. jobs in government department and private business, factories, etc.

traders later when the price is high, or such other time when the traders wants him to deliver. In such cases the peasant often takes money advances from the traders. This is some kind of crop hypothecation system on the basis of the anticipated price of the grain. In short, these big peasants take the position of 'bepari', with the added advantage that they themselves are big cultivators of the villages with the attendant social and political connections. This is the most general form. Besides this, we found in Dhima and Baghnagri, the families who were original grain traders have now acquired land and carrying on two occupations simultaneously. In a few cases these big peasants does speculation in grain directly, i.e. they buy grain in the immediate post-harvest cheap price in order to sell later at higher prices. Besides, these kind of trading operation,

these big peasants often does petty contract work. They often work as managers in their former landlords' 'hat', factory, etc. Another thing that one finds frequently in them is the transport business, i.e. operating lorry and mini buses. In recent times some of their family members, particularly those in Brahmin and other higher caste families who are traditionally well educated, are going for teaching and other jobs. Usually these people go for better paid posts than those of the middle or smaller peasants. In the following lines we furnish certain specific instances of non-agricultural jobs of the big peasants^{21/}:

- a) One member of Biswan Singh's family has grain trading as his main occupation. He buys grain from the middle and poor peasants from his own village as well as neighbouring villages and sell them to a local Marwari businessman, who is socially and politically important person in Banmankhi block. Biswan Singh's family has a grocery shop in Banmankhi town nearby. Another member of this family is also engaged in various kinds of contract work from the government.
- b) Kamal Singh, another important landowners of the village often does speculative trade in grain. During 1981, for

^{21/} Some of these cases we have already discussed in the case history of the big peasants: earlier. Yet we put together the facts here for better understanding of our points.

example, he bought 'tisi', an oilseed, in the local market after the harvest and sold it when the price was high. He reportedly made Rs.6000 in that transaction.

- c) The mukhiya of Dhima village combine his cultivation with contract job, which is done in the name of his daughter. He also works as manager in a weekly local market owned by Mani Babu family, an ex-zamindar of Purnea.
- d) Premial's family in Dhima are the most important cultivator-cum-trader family in the village. Now divided, the three main sections of this family monopolises between themselves the grain trade of the village. They also run grocery shop (in the village as well as in Banmankhi), one medical shop (in Banmankhi town), and flour mills in the village.
- e) Ganga Shah of Biddhipur (Patna) is a petty cultivator and a grain trader. He has an oilmill, a threshing mill and a grocery. He usually deals in rice, 'dhania' and 'mirchi'. In an interview he told us that he gets good support from Ramji Singh, the biggest landlord of the village. Ganga Shah's eldest son is engaged in petty contract work, primarily from the Government Public Works Department.
- f) Jorilal Jha of Raghuni Dehat has members of his family engaged in transport, grain and other business. His one son is in Jamshedpur in education.

- g) The Panjiar family of Baghnagri, like the Premial's family of Dhima, combine trade with cultivation. In fact, their primary accumulation is from trade.
- h) Subadh Singh of Maina Tanr is also a cultivator, sundry business man and a political operative articulated into one person. He has a flourishing medical store in Bikram and a flour mill in the villages. He is also a money lender. This village being near to the Bikram, the itinerant traders from the town visit the village. All these traders have long standing business relation with the big landlords.
- i) Lakshmi Jha, an important Brahmin landlord of Baghnagri (Madhubani) has good relation with the Panjiars. But his most important source of income, other than cultivation, is service. His brothers are holding important posts in the State bureaucracy.

These are only a few specific instances which have been given here in support of the table 2.14 to stress the nature of inter-connection between landowning classes of our villages and trade and other sectors of the economy.

Like the big landowners, the small and the middle landowners are also engaged in various kinds of non-agricultural occupations. (This excludes moneylending). Usually these jobs are petty

trading and contract work and lower level jobs in the government department and private offices. In some villages even the landless classes are found engaged in jobs like rickshaw pulling, peon, etc. In Table 2.14, we have given the pattern of non-agricultural work of landless and the poor and middle peasants. We have the number of household engaging in such jobs as transport (driving rickshaw or tumbum, etc.), petty trade, teaching, caste occupation. The landless labourers mainly work in various government relief work during the lean period. Only in Dhima we found two of them working as petty bepari during off season.

Table 2.14 : Non-Agricultural Occupation of Landless, Poor and Middle Peasants - All Villages

Area Owned (Acre)	No. of house- hold	Agri. works	Non-Agricultural Occupation (No.)						
			Govt. Relief Works	Trans- port	Trade	Ser- vice	Teach- ing	Caste occu- pat- ion*	Ot- her
Landless		65	60	Nil	2	1	Nil	4	3
Below 2.5	72	3	3	2	1	10	2	6	6
2.5 - 5.0		4	4	4	2	6	5	3	1
5.0 - 10.0	8	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	6	2	Nil	Nil
Non-reporting**	23								
Total	103								

* Exclude money lending. See chapter V on this.

** Non-reporting also includes those who do not do any work other than cultivation, particularly among the middle peasant.

This is largely due to nearness of the Banmankhi agricultural market. Some of the landless Brahmins are doing their caste

occupation still now in Raghuni Dehat, Biddhipur and Maina Tanr. They combine their caste occupation with sharecropping. The small peasants does not usually work in the government relief work unless it is absolutely necessary. We found them engaged in the following work (along with own cultivation and sharecropping) :

- a) Jobs in government and private offices and mills and factories. They are usually engaged in lower ranking jobs like darwans, peons, etc.
- b) Transport : They usually drive rickshaws and tumtum bought with the help of subsidy given by various banks. They earn on an average Rs.10 to 15 per day. The landless and poor peasants engaged in this type of occupations could be seen frequently in Dhima, Biddhipur and Maina Tanr.
- c) Milk selling : This is found in all the five villages. The usual practice is to get buffaloes from the big peasants on share (50:50). Half of the milk is given to the owner and the other half is sold either within the villages or outside. In Biddhipur this work is highly profitable because of the existence of Milk Cooperative, there which finance the purchase of buffaloes and also buy milk. The 'kahars', a backward caste, are very competent buffalo keepers in Biddhipur. They earn Rs.20 per day by selling milk only.


- d) Petty business like panshops and taking sub-contracts from road contractors. This we found in Dhima and Maina Tanr which are very close to the block office.
- e) Traditional occupations like pottery, etc. as in Biddhipur.
- f) Caste occupation : The major caste occupation that is still largely prevalent in the job of priest, which are usually done by the Brahmins. But the former 'jajmani system' is in the wane. The priests are usually paid in kind.

The middle peasants, on the other hand, do not work as labourers in other fields. They usually combine their self-cultivation (along with sharecropping) with jobs in government and private offices (usually as clerk, etc. because of their relatively higher education), teaching, petty trading and occasionally contract work. The latter profession is particularly prevalent among the Brahmins and Kayasth middle peasant.

IV



In conclusion we would like to point out again the limitations of our data. Our data are drawn from five villages distributed randomly and are very much affected by the specific conditions of these villages. We have, therefore, used them

Concentration Curve




56 i

Concentration Curve



Concentration Curve



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5. Lenin, V.I., The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Progress Publisher, Moscow, 1967, p.181.
6. Zharadwaj, K., Production Conditions in Indian Agriculture, Cambridge University Press. See also Bhaduri, A., "Class Relations and Commercialization in India Agriculture : A Study in Post-Independence Agrarian Reform in U.P.", a paper presented in the Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, November 1981.
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CHAPTER III

The Attached Labourers : How Unfree they are?

Following the manner of our presentation in this report we first put forward briefly the basic concepts that underlie our discussion in this chapter. One concept that implicitly runs through our discussion here, as indeed throughout this report, was the characteristics of the big landowners mentioned in chapter I; i.e. whether these big landowners are capitalist farmers or not. We define the capitalist mode of production as production for commodities where, first, the surplus is appropriated through the commodity wage labour and, second, the relationship between the labour and the capital becomes wholly economic. In a transitional social formation this capitalist mode of production is often articulated with pre-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation; e.g. the capitalist farmer might employ attached labour (i.e. unfree labour) along with the free casual labour. In some situation the attached labour becomes a condition for development of the capitalist mode of production itself.

In this chapter we specifically discuss the conditions of employment of attached labour, the changes that have come in it and its impact on the conditions of employment of casual labour, particularly its wage structure.

The first question that we ask here is "who employs these

labourers and what are his conditions of employment" in the labour markets of our five villages. In table 3.1, we give the occupation pattern of various classes defined in terms of their landholding. We have divided the occupation pattern of various classes into two categories of cultivators and agricultural labourers. The number of households in this table does not agree with that given in table 2.2 in chapter II because of the following reasons : (a) the landless doing sharecropping

Table 3.1 : Occupation Pattern in Five Villages

(No. of Households)

Occupation	Raghuni Dehat	Bagh- nagri	Dhima	Maina Tanr	Biddhipur
I. Cultivation					
Landless (0.0 acre)	-	-	-	-	-
Small Peasant (Below 5.0)	22	14	17	9	25
Middle Peasant (5.0 - 10.0)	5	2	3	2	4
Big Peasant (10.0 +)	5	6	7	5	6
II. Agriculture Labour					
Landless (0.0 acre)	9	3	10	Nil	3
Small Peasant (Below 5.0)	11	13	22	6	13
Middle Peasant (5.0 - 10.0)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Big Peasant (10.0 +)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil

have been grouped together with small peasants doing cultivation in section I and column 2 in table 3.1; (b) the upper castes having less than 2.5 acre usually do not do agricultural labour work which explains less number of small peasants engaged in agricultural labour in section II (1) in the table. There are 4 such Brahmins and Rajput families in Biddhipur, 1 brahmin family in Baghnagri; (c) one backward caste family in Maina Taur (Lohar) combine cultivation work with caste occupation. He does not do agricultural labour work. All these explain the quantitative discrepancies in the distribution of household in tables 2.2 and 3.1. The table 3.1 shows that the principal supplier of labour are the landless and the small peasants. The middle peasants do not work in other field. All these peasants are, however, cultivators. Even the landless, whose only claim as cultivator is the small plot of land taken on crop sharing basis, called themselves cultivators (see section I of table 3.1).

These labouring classes are employed by all categories of farmers : (a) small (below 5.0); (b) middle 5.0 - 10.0); and (c) big (10.0 and above). They employ three categories of labour : (a) family labour; (b) attached labour; and (c) casual labour. The extent of employment of outside labour by various classes of farmers and the type of labour used by them have been given in tables 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. For the small and middle peasants the dominant source of labour supply is the family labour (table 3.3). The small farmers employ outside labour only during

Table 3.2 : Extent of Employment of Outside Labour

Ratio of Male Agri- culture Labour to Family Labour (%)	(No.)					Total
	Raghuni Dehat	Bagh- nagri	Dhima	Maina Tanr	Biddhi- pur	
Below 10	6	2	9	3	4	24
10 - 20	1	-	1	-	-	2
20 - 30	1	2	-	1	1	5
30 - 50	-	-	-	-	-	-
50 - 70	1	-	-	-	-	1
70 +	8	10	9	9	10	46
Total	17	14	19	13	15	78
N (Sample)	32	22	43	32	16	151

the period of ploughing and harvesting when the work has to be completed within a specified time limit (Table 3.4). Their employment of attached labour is not much. It is done mainly by the upper caste peasants or those who have migrated out for work. The middle peasants employ outside labour - both attached and casual - to a greater extent than the small as shown by

Table 3.3 : Pattern of Labour Use - All Villages
(Average Mandays Per Household)

Land Owned (Acre)	No. of Household	Family Labour	Attached Labour	Casual Labour	Total
Below 5.0	40	74.3	17.4	9.7	101.4
5.0 - 10.0	15	105.1	144.7	124.4	374.1
10.0 - 15.0	6	83.7	275.8	458.7	818.7
15.0 - 20.0	3	142.0	232.7	528.0	902.7
20.0 - 40.0	7	319.7	1166.7	618.3	2304.7
40.0 - 60.0	5	316.2	1506.2	1219.8	3042.7
60.0 +	6	635.3	2539.0	2867.8	6042.2
Total	82	159.84	441.9	435.4	1035.1

Table 3.4 : Operation-wise Labour Use - All Villages
Combined (Average Mandays Per Household)

Size - Class (Area Owned)	Ploughing	Sowing	Weeding	Harvesting	Threshing
1. 60.0 +					
Family Labour	148.0	148.0	145.3	144.7	49.3
Attached Labour	889.5	284.2	564.0	588.7	212.7
Casual Labour	353.5	633.5	835.7	971.8	73.3
TOTAL	1391.0	1065.7	1545.0	1720.2	335.3
2. 40.0 - 60.0					
Family Labour	72.4	72.4	48.8	70.0	60.6
Attached Labour	438.6	166.8	219.4	200.4	234.8
Casual Labour	144.2	379.0	450.0	446.6	46.2
TOTAL	655.2	618.2	710.2	717.0	341.6
3. 20.0 - 40.0					
Family Labour	63.4	64.9	59.1	64.9	67.4
Attached Labour	571.1	92.0	119.3	168.0	205.4
Casual Labour	-	102.9	427.1	257.0	42.1
TOTAL	634.6	259.7	605.6	489.9	315.5
4. 15.0 - 20.0					
Family Labour	32.0	28.7	29.3	30.0	22.0
Attached Labour	48.0	48.3	76.0	55.7	19.3
Casual Labour	33.3	119.3	222.0	124.7	14.0
TOTAL	113.0	196.3	327.3	210.3	55.3
5. 10.0 - 15.0					
Family Labour	18.5	18.5	14.1	18.0	14.5
Attached Labour	76.2	57.0	47.0	58.6	31.2
Casual Labour	29.3	109.2	179.5	123.3	17.3
TOTAL	124.0	184.6	240.7	197.8	71.0
6. 5.0 - 10.0					
Family Labour	18.8	24.5	16.6	25.5	19.8
Attached Labour	36.3	34.2	20.1	34.8	19.2
Casual Labour	2.4	36.7	44.9	40.4	-
TOTAL	57.5	95.4	81.6	100.6	39.0
7. Below 5.0					
Family Labour	10.0	18.4	16.6	20.0	9.4
Attached Labour	5.1	2.8	1.9	4.9	2.9
Casual Labour	0.9	4.6	3.5	0.8	-
TOTAL	15.9	25.7	21.8	25.7	12.4

average mandays of labour per household employed by the middle peasants in table 3.3. They make use of attached labour primarily in ploughing, sowing and harvesting, (table 3.4) i.e. in cases where one needs specialised knowledge (e.g. in transplanting) and where work has to be completed within a definite time limit (e.g. harvesting). This argument is particularly applicable in case of upper caste peasants, who do not touch plough unless under compulsion. These peasants employ casual labour primarily for weeding, harvesting and also sowing (Table 3.4) where again the main factor is the time limit. As for the big peasants (10 acre or more) the character of family labour is different from that of the small and the middle. Though they often found to be working in the field along with his labourers (particularly the backward caste peasants), the character of their work is primarily supervisory. Even then average mandays of family labour per household put in by these class of farmers are much less than the average mandays of outside labour - both attached and casual - employed by them (Table 3.4). For ploughing the big peasants employ primarily attached labour. In this operation the average mandays of attached labour employed per household of big peasants is uniformly higher than average mandays of casual labour employed per big peasant household. This is true for all classes of farmers above 10 acres (Table 3.4). There are two reasons for this : the ploughing (and seed

bed preparation) needs careful and continuous attention which come more easily from the attached labour. The other contributory factor is that upper caste peasants usually do not touch plough and is, therefore, dependent on attached labour for this specialised work. They do not usually depend on casual labour for these works because of uncertainty and lesser control they have on these categories of labour. On the other hand, for sowing and weeding and also harvesting, these farmers employ casual labour more than the attached labour. The average mandays of casual labour employed by all categories of big peasants are higher than average mandays of attached labour employed by these peasants in all these operations (Table 3.4). The main reason is that in each of these operations the work has to be done within a specified period which cannot be done by the attached labour alone.

The attached labourers are, therefore, employed by all classes of farmers. But its largest employers are the big farmers of all classes (Table 3.5). In fact, the larger the land holding the larger we found the retinue of the attached labourers. The middle and some of the small peasants also employ attached labourer. In their case two factors operate : (a) caste (b) migration of the menfolk to the cities. In the table 3.5, we find the middle and small peasants employing attached laboruers are mostly Brahmins and Bhumi-hars for whom touching plough is still a taboo. One Yadav family in Baghnagri and one Barai

Table 3.5 : Employment of Attached Labour

Employer (Acre Owned)/Caste	(No.)					Total
	Raghuni Dehat	Bagh- nagri	Dhima	Maina Tanr	Biddhi- pur	
1. Small Peasant (Below 5.0)						
Brahmin	3	-	-	-	2	5
Bhumihar	-	-	-	2	2	4
Yadav	-	1	-	-	-	1
Barai	1	-	-	-	-	1
2. Middle Peasant (5.0-10.0)						
Brahmin	-	3	2	-	-	5
Bhumihar	-	3	-	2	-	5
3. Big Peasant (10.0 +)						
Brahmin	28	9	-	-	-	37
Rajput	-	-	9	-	-	9
Bhumihar	-	-	-	18	10	28
Yadav	-	3	3	-	-	6
Barai	9	-	-	-	-	9
4. Total						
Brahmin	31	12	2	-	2	47
Rajput	-	-	9	-	-	9
Bhumihar	-	3	-	22	12	37
Yadav	-	4	3	-	-	7
Barai	10	-	-	-	-	10
5. Grand Total	41	19	14	22	14	110
6. Non-reporting						6

family in Raghuni Dehat also employ attached labourer. In both these cases the reasons are paucity of family labour. In relative terms Dhima (Purnea) and Biddhipur (Patna) have lesser number of attached labour than Raghuni Dehat and Baghnagri (both in Madhubani). Both Dhima and Biddhipur have modern agriculture in terms of irrigation, tractor, pumpset and input use. But it is difficult to attribute these factors to the presence of lesser number of

attached labourer in Dhima and Biddhipur. For Maina Tanr (Patna), which falls in the same developed agricultural zone and satisfy all these conditions, has large presence of attached labourer.

In most cases these attached labourers are agricultural labourer with no land. Any peasant with any amount of land does not offer himself for attached labour. In our case at least we did not find any landowning peasants turning into attached labourer out of 110 attached labourer interviewed by us. These landless offer themselves for attached labour for the security of jobs and other things like loan. For the casual labourer it is more difficult to get these things from the big peasants. These landless attached labourers are invariably found to be taking land from his employer in sharecropping and indebted to them. (This is over and above the land and money advance that he gets as part of his wage as attached labour). This enables the landlord employee to keep a tighter hold on the attached labourers and exploit them in many obvious and not so obvious manner. Over and above there is the lingering burden of caste subscribing to a general atmosphere of subordination of the lower classes to the upper classes. The attached labourers are mostly schedule castes and a few backward castes like Yadav. The Dusadhs and Yadavs are much wanted attached labourers for their efficiency. We found only 7 banias as attached labour and a lone Brahmin attached labour (Table 3.6). This brahmin attached labour is in Baghnagri (Madhubani) who has offered himself as an attached labour to a big brahmin landlord in order to pay up his family debt.

Table 3.6 : Attached Labour and Its Caste

Caste	(No.)			Total
	Small Peasant (Below 5.0)	Middle Peasant (5.0 - 10.0)	Big Peasant (10.0 +)	
Dusadh	2	4	25	31
Yadav	-	-	20	20
Mushahar	-	2	6	8
Bania	6	-	1	7
Tanti	4	-	10	14
Barai	-	-	9	9
Dhobi	-	-	5	5
Chamar	1	1	5	7
Others	4	3	9	16
Total	16	10	90	116

An attached labour is usually given (a) a small plot of land; (b) some money (usually without interest) at the time of contract. Further they are usually paid wages in kind at fixed rates in major agricultural operations. The size of the plot and money given depends on the economic position of the employer. In table 3.7 we have given the average acres of land and money advanced per attached labourer by different classes of farmer

Table 3.7 : Conditions of Employment of Attached Labour - All Villages

Employer (Acre Owned)	Land (Average Acre)	Money Advance (Rs per person)
1. Small Peasant (Below 5.0)	.26	200
2. Middle Peasant (5.0 - 10.0)	.49	398
3. Big Peasant (10.0 +)	.47	375

employers. The average size of land and money given by small peasants to their attached labourer are much lower than that given by the middle and big peasants. In order to illustrate this point further we have given this information in further break-up in table 3.8. It is evident that our observation about difference in the conditions of employment (in terms of land and money given) remains unchanged. The poor peasants below 2.5 acres does not advance any money at all and the average size of land given by them is only .31 acre. Those having land between 2.5 to 5.0 acre gives on an average .25 acre and Rs.201 per attached labourer. In comparison to both

Table 3.8 : Conditions of Employment of Attached Labourers - All Villages

Employers (Acre Owned)	Land (Average Acre)	Money Advance (Rs per person)
Below 2.5	.31	-
2.5 - 5.0	.25	201
5.0 - 7.5	.49	297
7.5 - 10.0	.50	567
10.0 - 20.0	.59	500
20.0 - 40.0	.43	414
40.0 - 60.0	.58	421
60.0 +	.43	356

these two classes the middle and big peasants give higher average acre of land and greater amount of money per attached labourer. The average size of land and the money given per person vary

between regions. In Biddhipur, which falls within the green revolution belt of Patna district, the average acre of land and money given per person by all classes of farmers are higher than that given by these classes in other four villages (Table 3.9). In Biddhipur the land owning classes are all upper caste Brahminars. In Maina Tanr, which falls in the same agricultural zone, the small farmers between 2.5 to 5.0 land size, have given .28 average acre of land and Rs.200 per attached labour employed

Table 3.9 : Conditions of Employment of Attached Labour
(Region-wise)

	Raghuni Dehat		Baghnagri		Dhima		Maina Tanr		Biddhipur	
Employers (Acre Owned)	Land Adva- (Av. nce acre) (Rs./ per- son		Land Adva- (Av. nce acre) (Rs./ per- son		Land Adva- (Av. nce acre) (Rs./ per- son		Land Adva- (Av. nce acre) (Rs./ per- son		Land Adva- (Av. nce acre) (Rs./ per- son	
Below 2.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2.5 - 5.0	.31	-	.22	4	-	-	.28	200	.50	425
5.0 - 7.5	.38	137	.37	75	-	-	.35	850	-	-
7.5 - 10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.50	567
10.0 - 20.0	-	-	.61	250	-	-	-	-	.50	500
20.0 - 40.0	.44	-	.45	367	-	-	.31	300	.47	500
40.0 - 60.0	-	-	.45	600	-	-	.62	385	-	-
60.0 +	.34	310	.45	300	.62	-	.41	500	.58	406

by them which is lower than that given by the middle and big farmers in that village. In Maina Tanr two things are worth mentioning. In the size class of 5.0 to 7.5 acre the money

advanced per attached labourer is highest among all the villages. This is mainly due to the presence of one farmer in Maina Tanr who is basically a teacher in Bikram and, therefore, depends on attached labourer primarily for cultivation, and gives more money to them for incentive. In the size class of 40.0 to 60.0 also there exists in Maina Tanr a landowner who is a political activist and has other business. He pays higher average acre of land to his attached labour. In Baghnagri, which is in relatively underdeveloped agricultural zone in Madhubani, we found the small and middle peasants paying less land and money per attached labour than the big farmers. In Raghuni Dehat, which falls in the same agricultural zone, there is not much difference between classes in average land size given to the attached labourers. But the money advanced per attached labour is higher in case of big peasants than the middle peasants (in the category of 7.5 to 10.0 acre). The small peasants there does not pay money at all. In Raghuni Dehat we found the big landowners more oppressive to their attached labourers. (We return to this aspect of relationship between peasants and their attached labourers later in this chapter). In this village the 'barai' landowners, whose caste occupation is pan cultivation, and till today does his own cultivation work along with their labourer, usually pay less land and money to their attached labourers. The landowners of this caste having land holding of 60.0 acres or more pay .19 average acre of land and give only Rs.115 per attached labour. The upper caste peasants of this

category are little more liberal than this in terms of land given and money paid to the attached labourers (Table 3.10). (In this village we found a small farmer, barai by caste, had an attached labourer. In course of our investigation we found that this farmer was actually the eldest son of Gudri Reut, a

Table 3.10 : Conditions of Attached Labour (Region-wise and Caste-wise)

Employers (Acre owned) / Caste	Raghuni Dehat		Baghnagri		Dhima		Maina Tanr		Biddhipur	
	Land Advan- (Av. nce acre) (Rs./ per- son		Land Advan- (Av. nce acre) (Rs./ per- son		Land Advan- (Av. nce acre) (Rs./ per- son		Land Advan- (Av. nce acre) (Rs./ per- son		Land Advan- (Av. nce acre) (Rs./ per- son	
1. Below 2.5										
a) Barai	.31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2. 2.5 - 5.0										
a) Bhumihaar	-	-	-	-	-	-	.28	200	.5	500
b) Yadav	-	-	.22	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
3. 5.0 - 7.5										
a) Brahmin	.38	137	.37	75	-	-	-	-	-	-
b) Bhumihaar	-	-	-	-	-	-	.35	850	-	-
4. 7.5 - 10.0										
a) Bhumihaar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.5	567
5. 10.0 - 20.0										
a) Brahmin	-	-	.6	250	-	-	-	-	-	-
b) Bhumihaar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.5	500
c) Yadav	-	-	.62	250	-	-	-	-	-	-
6. 20.0 - 40.0										
a) Brahmin	.44	-	.45	467	-	-	-	-	-	-
b) Bhumihaar	-	-	-	-	-	-	.31	300	.47	500
7. 40.0 - 60.0										
a) Brahmin	-	-	.45	600	-	-	-	-	-	-
b) Bhumihaar	-	-	-	-	-	-	.62	385	-	-

Table 3.10 (Contd.)

Employers (Acre Owned/Caste	Raghuni Dehat		Baghnagri		Dhima		Maina Tanr		Biddhipur	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
B. 50.0 +										
a) Brahmin	.42	364	.45	300	-	-	-	-	-	-
b) Shumihar	-	-	-	-	-	-	.41	500	.58	406
c) Sarai	.19	115	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
d) Rajput	-	-	-	-	.62	-	-	-	-	-

big farmer of the village, and he still lives with his fater. We have excluded him from the table.) In Dhima, in Banmankhi block of Purnea district, the conditions of employment of attached labour are different from others. They are not given land and money. They are paid in cash on a monthly basis - usually 15 to 20 rupees per month - and given food and clothes. They live in their peasant employers' house, eat with them, work in their field, supervise others' work, tend the cattle, cleanse the cowshed and khaliens (court-yard). Instead of 'halwas' (ploughmen) as in other villages, they are called 'barahil', 'kamat' in Dhima. The farmers here do not usually keep 'halwas'. For ploughing they usually make use of tractors. (The Banmankhi block has largest tractor population in North Bihar). Only one landlord in Dhima has 'halwas', whom he has given land (.62 average acre) but no money. He is the biggest landowner of the village.

Though the attached labourers are paid land and money, their wages are lower than the casual labourer. In tables 3.11, 3.12,

3.13 we have given the wages for both casual and attached labourer. In preparing the tables we have made a few adjustments in the data. First, the information on wages has been collected from both the landowners and the labourers and averaged or otherwise adjusted after cross-checking from different sources. Second, the wage rates have not been adjusted to the normal mandays of 8 hours; e.g. in case of weeding the labourers are paid Rs.2 for 4 hours of work. Here it is not adjusted to 8 manhours a day. Third, we have given the average wages of paddy and wheat, the two main crops of the region covered in the study and the wages for jute in Dhima. This could be slightly misleading so far as the wages for wheat is concerned. The wages for wheat are slightly lower than that for paddy. Further, in case of such operation as sowing the wheat is usually broadcasted in the villages we have studied. The big peasants use their attached labourer for that.

Table 3.11 : Agriculture Wages

Agricultural Operations	Raghuni Dehat		Baghnagri	
	Casual Labour (Kg.)	Attached Labour (kg.)	Casual Labour (Kg.)	Attached Labour (Kg.)
1. Ploughing (wet)	2.43	1.9	2.5	1.25
(Dry)	1.77	1.8	1.57	1.57
2. Bunai (seed bed preparation)	-	-	-	-
3. Sowing	2.82	2.43	3.12	2.75
4. Weeding	1.72	1.25	-	1.25
5. Harvesting	8.78* (1/16)	8.78* (1/21)	8.69* (1/16)	8.69* (1/21)
6. Threshing	2.82	Nil	1.57	Nil

* Average weight of the grain taken from the village concern.

Table 3.12 : Agricultural Wages

Agricultural Operation	D h i m a		
	Casual Labour (Rs.)	Attached Labour (Rs.)	
1. Ploughing (Bullock)	7*	Jute	2
(Tractor)	12**	14	2
2. Bunai (Seed bed preparation)	-	-	-
3. Sowing	1.87	-	1.5
4. Weeding	1.5	1.5	1.5
5. Harvesting	Kg.15*** (1/10)	2.65	Kg.15*** (1/10)
6. Threshing	Kg.2.5	Kg.1****	-

* Rs.6 for wheat

** Rs.14 for wheat and jute

*** Average weight of the bundle in the village

**** Per 8 kg processed.

For various aspects of calculation of the table see the body of the report.

Table 3.13 : Agricultural Wages

Agricultural Operations	Maina Tanr		Biddhipur	
	Casual Labour (Kg.)	Attached Labour (Kg.)	Casual Labour (Kg.)	Attached Labour (Kg.)
1. Ploughing	4.7	1.5	2.8 (or Rs.4)	1.8
2. Bunai (seed bed preparation)	-	-	-	-
3. Ropni (Sowing)	2.3	1.4	2.5	1.8
4. Weeding	1.4	1.2	1.5	1.8
5. Harvesting	14.0* (1/16)	14.0* (1/21)	14.0* (1/16)	14.0* (1/21)
6. Threshing	1.8	1.7	2.6	Nil

* Average weight of the bundle. See the body of the report for comments on the various aspects of the table.

The small and the middle usually do it themselves. Fourth, during the harvesting time, the wage is usually paid in piece rates. The rate for the casual labour is 1 'bojha' (stack) for every 16 'bojha' (stack) for all villages we worked except Dhima where the rate is 1:10 'bojha' (stack). Baghnagri, Maina Tanr and Biddhipur the rate for the attached labour is 1:21 'bojha' (stack). In Dhima they get it at the rate of 1:10. While converting the 'bojha' (stack) into grain (kg.) we have taken the average weight of grain per 'bojha' (stack) in each village during the period of our survey. Such a procedure does not take into account the difference in the productivity of various crops between various classes in the village. But this factor does not affect substantially the basic objective of these tables which is to compare the wage rates of casual labour and attached labour. From these tables a few observations can be made. First, the wages of attached labourers are less than that of the casual labourers in all regions for all operations except harvesting which is paid in piece rate. Second, in Dhima the wages are paid in cash except in the harvesting operations when it is paid in kind piece rate system. Two features have contributed to this : (a) the presence of one of the biggest agricultural produce market within 2 kms. of Dhima; and (b) existence of tractor in Dhima i.e. higher degree of mechanisation. For the use of tractor the peasants have been compelled to pay in cash. Third, there is no regional pattern in the wages of attached labourers. For example, the wages of attached labour in Raghuni Dehat are more

than that in Maina Tanr and Biddhipur, which falls within the developed agricultural zone. On the other hand, the wages of attached labourer in Biddhipur, a developed village, is higher than that in Baghnagri (except sowing), which is in the same backward regions of Raghuni Dehat. In case of Dhima, where the wages are paid in cash even to the attached labourer, it is low when the money wage is converted to the grain in term of pre-harvest retail prices (we think that the pre-harvest retail price should be the most realistic conversion factor as the money wages are paid in operations like ploughing, sowing and weeding which falls within the pre-harvest period). Fourth, as for the operation-wise wages of casual labour, the rates for ploughing is higher in Maina Tanr, Biddhipur and Dhima than in Raghuni Dehat and Baghnagri, which are in agriculturally backward regions. In Dhima the use of tractors are increasing. In this village the ploughmen get highest wage of Rs.7 and in cash. In sowing and weeding, however, the rates are higher in Maina Tanr, Biddhipur and in Dhima the rates are lower than in Raghuni Dehat and Baghnagri. This is largely due to migration. In Dhima it is the Santhal migrant labourers which create a situation of excess labour supply and depresses wage. In Maina Tanr and Biddhipur the migrant labourers comes from Aruah, Ghepra, Muzaffarpur, etc. From the above discussions one can make the following observations :

(a) though all classes of landowners employ attached labourer, the extent of employment of attached labourers differ between

classes of landowners. The big peasants employ more than the middle and the small. The necessity for employment of attached labour by the big peasant arises from the necessity of assured and continuous labour supply in such skilled operations as ploughing etc. which needs to be completed within a specified time period. Among the middle and the small peasant, it is mostly the upper castes who employ attached labourer as they do not operate plough (i.e. the caste factor). The other reason is the out-migration which depletes the supply of their family labour. (b) Even the developed regions like Biddhipur and Maina Tanr has large number of attached labourers. (c) The attached labourers are given land, money (without interest usually) and wages at fixed rates for specific operations. The big peasants usually pay more money and land, particularly in the comparatively developed area. (d) In the areas where the use of tractors have become significant (as in Dhima) the character of attached labour has changed significantly. Unlike in less mechanised village, in this village the ploughing is done by tractor rather than by 'halwas'. The attached labourers are used for weeding, as cow boy etc. They are paid in cash. Besides they get wages in cash plus food and clothes. (e) In comparison to the casual labour, the wages of attached labour is generally lower. Their wages are paid in kind except in Dhima, where the payment is made in cash. This is due to the specific factor of the location of this village near a big market. There is no regional pattern in the wage structure of the attached labour. (f) As for the

wages of casual labour their wages for ploughing is higher in the more developed areas. In case of sowing and weeding it is low in these areas because of the migration of casual labour from other areas along with the prevalence of attached labourers.

So far we discussed the extent, character and wage structure of the attached labour. But these are not sufficient to answer our main question : whether these attached labourers are another form of wage labour or a surviving pre-capitalist elements. In his Results of the Immediate Process of Production, Marx has dealt with these concepts thus :

"The form based on absolute surplus value (our emphasis) is the formal subsumption of labour under capital.^{1/} it is only formally distinct from earlier modes of production on whose foundations it arises spontaneously (or is introduced All that changes is that compulsion is applied i.e. the method by which surplus labour is extorted. The essential feature of formal subsumption are :

"1. The pure money relationship between the man who appropriates the surplus labour and the man who yields it up : subordination in this case arises from the specific content of the sale - there is not a subordination underlying it in which the producer stands in a relation to the exploiter of

^{1/} All emphasis are Marx's unless otherwise stated.

his labour which determined not just by money (the relationship of one commodity owner to another), but by political constraint. What brings the seller into a relationship of dependency is solely the fact that the buyer is the owner of the conditions of labour. There is no fixed political and social relationship of supremacy and subordination".

"2. This is implicit in the first relationship : it is that his objective conditions of labour (the means of production) and the subjective conditions of labour (the means of subsistence) confront him as capital, as the monopoly of the buyer of his labour power". (Marx, 1976, III, 1025-1026)

Further on, Marx said :

"If supremacy and subordination come to take the place of slavery, serfdom, vassallage and other patriarchal forms of subjection, the change is purely one of form. The form becomes freer, because it is objective in nature, voluntary in appearance, purely economic."

"Alternatively, supremacy and subordination in the process of production supplant an earlier state of independence. . . . Here then we encounter the loss of an earlier independence in the process of production, and the relation of supremacy and subordination is itself the result of the rise of capitalist production."^{2/}

^{2/} Marx, K., Capital, Vol.I, pp.1027-1028, The Pelican Marx Library.

The above somewhat lengthy quotation is a lucid exposition of the differentia specifica of formal subsumption stage of the capital. In this exposition one also finds Marx's method of looking into pre-capitalist relations of production. For our purpose three things need to be noted specially. First, in the formal subsumption stage the absolute surplus value is the main form of surplus. Second, in the formal subsumption stage there is a change in the method of surplus appropriation only. The personal relationship based on social and political constraint of the earlier mode of production is replaced by surplus appropriation through control of the conditions of production. Third, and which follows closely from the second, is that the direct producer loses its earlier economic independence. A situation of supremacy and subordination in the sphere of social and political plane is replaced by a situation of supremacy and subordination in the process of production (with its own political and social expression).

In the light of the above discussion what will be the status of attached labour? Are they free labour or bonded labour of some form? During the time of our survey we did not find any formal contract between the attached labourers and their employers. In some cases we were told that there used to be written contract between the attached labourers and their employers before the passing of the Bonded Labour Act in 1975. The contract used to be written down in two pieces of paper with thumb impressions of both the labourer and the employer and each used to keep one

paper. We were told that this practice has been discontinued after the passing of the Act. This information has, however, many versions and our attempt to procure a specimen contract form failed to evoke any response from the informants except in one case in Biddhipur. But the document shows to us appeared to be older than 1973 when we were told it was written.

There is no doubt, however, that most of the attached labourers are working for long period with their present employer. In table 3.14 we have given the duration of jobs of the attached labourers employed by various classes of farmers. In dividing the employers of various classes we have used the land owned by them as the main criterion as elsewhere in the report. As we noted earlier, the major employers of attached labourers are the big peasants with land having 10 acre or more land. In their case the attached labourers are usually employed for longer period. Only 12 out of

Table 3.14 : Duration of Jobs (No. of Attached Labour)

Peasant Employer (Landowners)	Years Employed						Total
	1	2	3	4	5-10	10 +	
Below 5.0	-	-	1	2	3	1	7
5.0 - 10.0	-	-	1	1	5	2	12
10.0 - 20.0	-	-	-	-	6	2	8
20.0 - 40.0	-	-	1	2	13	10	26
40.0 - 60.0	-	-	-	1	6	9	16
60.0 +	-	5	-	3	10	20	38
Total	-	5	3	9	48	44	107

88 i.e. 14 per cent of attached labourers are employed by these peasants for 4 years or less. 35 out of 88 attached labourers i.e. 40 per cent are employed for 5 to 10 years. And 41 out of 107 i.e. 47 per cent of them are employed for more than 10 years by these big peasants. In Raghuni Dehat the durations are longest. In Dhima, on the other hand, the durations are the least. In case of middle peasants (5 to 10 acre) 8 out of 12 attached labourers i.e. almost 67 per cent are working for their employer for 5 to 10 years, and 2 out of 16 i.e. little over 17 per cent for more than 10 years. In case of small peasants (less than 5.0 acre) 3 out of 7 attached labour i.e. almost 43 per cent are working for 5 to 10 years and 1 for more than 10 years and the remaining 3 for 4 years or less.

The most important factor in the employment of attached labour is the money advanced by the peasants. The practice is that at the time of contract usually certain sums of money is given to the attached labourers which he usually uses to get his release from his earlier employer. Usually no interest is charged on this sum during the tenure of the attached labourer. But if he (the attached labourer) wants to leave his employer at any time the later demand interest. The release money includes the original sum and also interest for the entire service period. In the language of Ujjagar Das, an attached labour of Ramji Singh, a big landowner of Biddhipur :

"In 1973 I took Rs.828 from the 'malik' (Ramji Singh) to pay my former 'malik' to buy his release. Now (1980) Ramji Singh says I have to pay Rs.2500. If I want to go elsewhere of work as daily labour I will have to pay them money. Where do I get so much money?"

Ujjagar Das echoes the sentiment of 107 attached labourers interviewed by us in five villages. The loan is given not as part of wage. One frequently heard assertion of the landowners is that "the loan and land is given primarily to bind the labourers."

For their part, the attached labourers need this money and land. The little amount of grain that they get from their tiny plot of land protect them from the hazards of market forces at least for sometime. Their need for money could come from anything. It could be to earn his release from the existing job or to meet some social obligations like marriage, etc. For a landless these sums cannot be procured unless he accepts the life of an attached labourer. But once embraced, it is difficult for him to get out of it. From the wage he gets from his employer he cannot pay up his debt. Though formally nothing binds him to work in others field once his own employer's work is over, he hardly gets his time off after doing his employer's work. Not only he has to work in his employer's farm, he has also to do his domestic and other work which is not always so obvious. He often does not get time to plough his own tiny land. (The nature of their work depends on their caste. If he belongs to those backward and

schedule castes from whom his employer drinks water then he has to do all possible work at the employer's home. Otherwise, he is asked to look after buffaloes, etc.). The life story of Madho Sharma, an attached labour of Dhima, brings out the plight of their class brothers sharply :

"I took Rs.300 for my son's marriage and offer myself attached labourers to my present 'malik' ('That is how I address my employer'). I get Rs.25 per month. I have paid Rs.100 so far. Rs.200 is still due. It is difficult for me to pay my debt from my pay. I cannot do other work. Besides farm work, I have to look after 'malik's' buffaloes and whatever other work that my 'malik' asks me to do.

This is the usual story. Usually the bigger the landlord the stricter is the control. In case of the middle and the small landowners the control is more relaxed. The later, in fact, frequently express the sentiment that their 'halwas' do their work not so much as attached labourer but perhaps because they prefer to work in their (the middle peasant's) field.

Thus loan, and more importantly its continuation, which enables the 'malik' landowners to keep their attached labour in perpetual submission. The piece of land given to these attached labourers serves the same purpose. These are all economic noose.

One other factor, that need to be looked into for understanding the bondedness is the violence. It is a non-economic factor and does not fall in the sphere of political economy. Also, it does not form a direct object of our study. The analysis of violence posses difficulties as its is more often then not perpetrated silently. Only occasionally it bursts out in the open when these classes confront each other openly. During the period of our survey the attached labourers of Madhubani were agitating for minimum wages and debt redumption. Raghuni Dehat was part of it. This gave us glimpses of the brute force that these landowners employ to subdue their attached labourers whenever they dare to assert their right. In Raghuni Dehat the trouble started in June 1976 when the attached labourers began demanding minimum wages. The landowners retaliated by boycotting them and demanding their money back. Some of the landowners, mostly the smaller ones, initially agreed to meet the labourers demands. But Jorilal Jha and other big landlords summoned them in a meeting and threatened them to fine Rs.50 and physical punishment if they do not fall in line with him. Thereafter these landlords also joined the bigger ones in their boycott of the labouring classes. Thereafter Raghuni Dehat saw a series of incidents. We put below the most important ones to illustrate our points :

a) The typical incident was that of Ghuran Tanti, an attached labour of Jorilal Jha, the biggest landowner of the village. When Ghuran Tanti asked for 4 kilos of grain daily, Jorilal Jha barred him from going to the field and asked for Rs.700 that he gave to Ghuran Tanti as loan to earn his release from the earlier employee. The initial pressure came through 'Panchayats' packed with Jorilal Jha's men. Ghuran agreed to pay back the loan. He sold his bullock to pay Rs.300. But Jorilal Jha continued to press for the remaining Rs.400. But Ghuran Tanti pleaded inability and sought relief under the Debt Redemption Act in the local EDO's court. In the court, however, Jorilal Jha denied that Ghuran Tanti was his attached labourer at anytime or that at any time he had given any loan to Ghuran. It is after that the first major incident took place in the Jorilal Jha's courtyard. Ghuran was called there and asked to pay back the loan. When pleaded inability, he was beaten up by Jorilal Jha's men and threatened to be implicated in the gunsneatching case if he did not pay the loan. That time Ghuran was saved by his fellow labourers. But later in the day the landowners came in strength and forcibly took Ghuran to the Rajnagar Thana (the block headquarter), lodged FIR against Ghuran Tanti. Mahendra Paswan and Panchkori Tanti was also implicated in the case for allegedly trying to snatch guns. The later two were

also attached labourer and leaders of the movement. All of them were remanded in jail for 60 days after which they were released. When we met him, Ghuran Tanti was refused work in the village. He was going to the distant brick klin to work for Rs.4 daily and fighting his case in the court. Embittered and frustrated, he threw up his hand in despair and said "one years of court case has finished me off and have no hope now".

- b) The other person to suffer was Mahendra Paswan, because of his alleged connection with the CPI and his leadership quality. In his case his sister borne the burden of reprisal. One day in October 1976, when the fight was at its peak, Jorilal Jha's men caught hold of his 16 years old sister and molested her. On Mahendra Paswan's report, the police arrested Jorilal Jha but was released the same day on bail.
- c) Other types of reprisal was also perpetrated on the attached labourers. The crops in the land of the attached labourer were forcibly taken away, or destroyed. They were prevented from using the pond and cut grasses from the landowners land etc. They were not allowed to go to other villages for work.

These are very normal and part of the village life. It comes to the fore whenever the attached labourers try to assert their

right. In Siddhipur (Patna) we witnessed one such incident. In that village, Sukhen Mochi, a 'halwa' of Bhagwat Singh was beaten up badly when he refused to plough Bhagwat Singh's land as he was not being paid regularly. From this ensemble of isolated incidents one has one comment to make : the ability of the landowners to wield this force creates a situation which enable these landowners to use the economic squeeze through loans and land freely. But the violence itself is a separate subject for research. We add this few lines almost as an epilogue to this chapter on attached labourer and their life of bondage.

In conclusion we can note the following points : (a) All landowning classes employ attached labourers. The big landowners employ more than the middle and the small. The big landowners employ mainly for economic reasons : for an assured supply of labour power for agricultural operations that have to be completed within a time period. For the middle and small, the reasons are combinations of caste and shortage of family labour because of out-migration. ⁷⁹⁹⁵ (b) The employment of attached labourer is universal. It exists both in developed and underdeveloped agricultural zone. But in region like Dhima where the degree of mechanisation is high (because of the use of tractor) the character of attached labour has changed. They are not used for ploughing - the operation in which they are used most elsewhere. (c) Their wage basket is comprised of land, money (without interest) and

daily wages at fixed rate. The big peasants usually pay more money and bigger size of land than the middle and the small. This wage is paid in kind usually. But in areas of greater degree of mechanisation they are paid in cash. The wages of attached labourers are usually lower than the wages of casual labourer. The casual labour's wage itself is not very high - lower than the officially prescribed minimum. In some areas (e.g. Dhima) it is high in ploughing, but not in other agricultural operations. (d) No formal contract exists between the attached labourers and their employer. Further, the labourer is apparently free to do any other work after the completion of their 'maliks' work. But they seldom has time for that. This is particularly true if the malik is a big peasant. Not only does the attached labourer work underpaid in the employers big farm, he is forced to do other work which are not always so obvious to an outsider. The situation is somewhat relaxed if the employer happens to be the middle or the small peasants. The chief mechanism through which an attached labourer is bounded down is loan and, also, land. Though usually no interest is charged on the amount advanced, the attached labour is asked to pay the interest along with original sum if he wants to leave his employer without the consent of the later. The loan amount is kept snowballing by the employer's artifices, and the labourer is kept confined to the employer's farm (or home) by heavy load of work. He does not get time to earn extra by working elsewhere.

And the labourer is compelled to pay the money whenever he chooses to act on his volition by unrestrained use of force by the landowners.

CHAPTER IV

The Tenants : Who Leases to Whom ?

In the earlier chapters we have discussed the landlords and various types of labourers employed by them. In this chapter we discuss the other of the three classes that we have taken up for investigation : the tenants.^{1/} The tenants per se cannot be associated with any specific mode of production. The first English capitalist farmers were tenants. On the other hand, the French metayage was an indigent farmer paying half of his produce as rent to his landowners. In his chapter on Absolute Rent and the Genesis of Capitalist Ground Rent in The Capital, Volume III, Marx has discussed various types of rents and has shown how the capitalist farmer emerges out of them.^{2/} Marx here defines the capitalist ground rent as the surplus over average profit paid by the farmers to the landowners for the use of his land. The absolute rent, on the other hand, is the surplus itself which is appropriated by the landowners for the monopoly ownership of land, this all-important conditions of agricultural production. These

^{1/} In writing this chapter we have been greatly influenced by Krishna Bharadwaj's study of tenancy in nine Orissa villages along with P.K. Das. See, Bharadwaj, K. and Das, P.K., Tenancy Conditions and Mode of Exploitation - A Study of Some Villages in Orissa, Economic and Political Weekly, Annual Number, February 1975 and RA, June 1975.

^{2/} Marx, K. Capital, Vol.3, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1962.

two concepts from the basis of our analysis of this chapter while discussing the following questions :

- a. Who leases to whom?
- b. The motivation and preference pattern of lessees and lessors in the tenancy markets;
- c. The terms and conditions of tenancies and how far they are affected by the resource positions of the lessees and lessors; and
- d. Various forms of tenural systems and changes in tenural conditions.

While discussing these questions we have constantly kept in view two theoretical issues as in the earlier chapters : First, whether out of these lessee-lessor groups the capitalist farmers are emerging or not.^{3/} Second, and which might co-exist with the first, the landlords, because of their monopoly ownership of land (and associated fragmentation of land in the specific context of North Bihar) is leasing out land to the landless and poor peasants and thereby, while appropriating surplus in the form of rent, is also ensuring supply of cheap labour power for agricultural production. This is the familiar problem of articulation of various modes - in our case the articulation of dominant capitalist mode with other pre-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation.

In presenting the information the tenants have been classified according to their operational holding and the landlords on the

^{3/} Like the migrant tenants of the Orissa villages in the paper of Krishna Bharadwaj, et al., op.cit.

basis of their ownership holding. We did not get any tenant landlord^{4/} i.e. the landlord who leases in some land but is a net lessor. We came across one owner tenants who also leases out mainly because the plots are far away from home. We have dropped him from our sample. As a result, we have the following three categories in the lease market :

1. Pure tenant
2. Owner tenant
3. Landlords

The pure tenants are those who are lessees only. The owner tenants are owners of land and lessees together. The landlords are those who have land which they lease out. In table 4.1 we have given the distribution of these classes for five villages separately. The operational holdings of pure tenants, usually landless, are mostly 2.5 acres or less. 30 out of a total of 32 pure tenants fall within these categories. Only 2 falls within the category of 2.5 to 5.0. These classes are scattered in all the five villages though their number is fewer in Biddhipur. We find a similar concentration of owner tenants in the category of 2.5 acre or less. 26 out of a total of 43 owner tenants are within this category. 10 are in the category of 2.5 to 5.0. 7 of them have (operation) holding size of 5 acres

^{4/} Krishna Bharadwaj, et al., ibid., p.227.

or more. They could be found scattered over all the five villages. Only in Maina Torr they are present in lesser number - only 3 out of 43, which are scattered evenly over three size classes. The landlords belong to all size classes of ownership holding. The largest number could, of course, be found in the category of 10 acres or more. This is true for all the villages. 31 out of 61 lessor-landlords are in this category. 15 of them are in the category of 5.0 to 10.0 acres. But quite a few of these lessor-landlords - 15 out of 61 - own 2.5 to 5.0 acre and 2 of them have only 2.5 acre or less. These are usually upper caste or those who have less working hands due to migration of their family members (See later for further argument on this point).

Thus we find that the lessor group is scattered in all size classes. Though to a lesser degree, this observation holds good for the lessee groups also. This raises the question which classes of lessors leases more or less to which classes of lessors and what bearing their class position (somewhat arbitrarily defined here in terms of land size), and its attendant economic strength, has on the lease terms. In order to look into the first part of this problematic (the later part is dealt with subsequently) we present the distribution of lease units according to various lessee-lessor groups - defined again in terms of land - in table 4.2. From the table one can note the following observations :

Table 4.1 : Frequency Distribution of Households
by Categories (No.)

Categories	Raghni- Dehat	Raghnagri	Dhima Maina Thar	Biddhipur	Total	
I. Pure Tenant (Operational Holding)						
0.0 - 2.5	11	5	5	7	2	30
2.5 - 5.0	-	-	1	1	-	2
5.0 - 7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
7.5 -10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
10.0 +	-	-	-	-	-	-
II. Owner Tenant (Operational Holding)						
0.0 - 2.5	8	5	2	1	10	26
2.5 - 5.0	1	3	2	1	3	10
5.0 - 7.5	3	-	-	1	-	4
7.5 -10.0	1	-	1	-	-	2
10.0 +	-	-	1	-	-	1
III. Landlords (Ownership Holding)						
0.0 - 2.5	-	-	-	-	2	2
2.5 - 5.0	-	-	5	1	7	13
5.0 - 7.5	1	2	2	1	1	7
7.5 -10.0	1	-	1	3	3	8
10.0 +	5	5	7	8	6	31
IV. Total	31	20	27	24	34	136

(a) the big peasants are the largest class of lessors. Out of 273 units leased out 173 come from this class. The middle peasant account for 59 and the poor peasants 35 lease units out of a total of 273 units. (b) The big peasants give larger number of units to the owner tenant. Out of 179 lease units leased out by them 104 units are given to the owner tenants and 75 to the pure tenants. The middle class of lessor have given 41 out of 59 lease units to the owner tenants and 18 to the pure tenants. The corresponding figures for the poor lessors are 30 and 5 respectively. (c) Further the big peasants lease out mostly to the poorer sections of the owner tenants. Out of 104 lease units given to this category of lessees, 44 lease units are given to those whose operational holding (owned plus leased in land) does not exceed 2.5 acre and 34 to those whose operational holding consists of 2.5 to 5 acre. Only 17 lease units have been given to those whose (operational) holding size is 5.0 to 10 acre and 9 to those whose (operational) land size falls within the size class of 10 acres or more, i.e. those who are big tenants. Similar trend in leasing out can be observed in the case of middle categories of lessors. They have leased out 21 out of 41 lease units to the smallest owner tenants (below 2.5), 12 to 2.5 to 5.0 class of owner tenants, 7 to those between 5.0 to 10 acre and only 1 to the big owner tenants (10.0 and above). The small peasants, on the other hand, leases out usually to the small and the middle classes of lessees. They have leased out 9 lease units

Table 4.2 : Frequency Distribution of Lease
Units According to Lessee-Lessor -
All Villages

Categories	Small Peasant (5.0)	Middle Peasant (5.0-10.0)	Big Peasant (10.0 +)	Total
I. Pure Tenants (Operational Holding)				
0.0 - 2.5	5	16	68	89
2.5 - 5.0	-	2	7	9
5.0 - 7.5	-	-	-	-
7.5 -10.0	-	-	-	-
10.0 +	-	-	-	-
II. Owner Tenant (Operational Holding)				
0.0 - 2.5	9	21	44	74
2.5 - 5.0	11	12	34	57
5.0 - 7.5	10	5	8	23
7.5 -10.0	-	2	9	11
10.0 +	-	1	9	10
III. Total	35	59	179	273

to those owner tenants who have only 2.5 or less acres of land, 11 units to those having 2.5 to 5 acres and 10 units to those having 5.0 to 7.5 acre. They have given nothing to the big owner tenants. As for the pure tenants, i.e. those lessees who have little or no land, the lessors show preference for those whose land size does not exceed 2.5 acre. Out of 75 lease units given to the pure tenants by the big lessor 68 are in this size and 7 in the size of 2.5 to 5.0 acre. The middle peasants too show the same preference pattern. Out of 18 lease units they have given 16 to the pure tenants who have less than 2.5 acre of (operational) holding and only 2 to those having 2.5 to 5.0. The small peasants have given out only 5 lease units to the pure peasants, all of which are in the lowest size class.

In order to look more closely into the preference pattern of various lessee-lessor groups, we have given the distribution of lease units in greater details in the table 4.3. In the table the big lessors have been divided into farther size classes. No changes have been made in the break up of the tenants. In fact, in their case we have closed the highest size class by limiting it to 15 acre. We find the distribution pattern of lease units conforms to the earlier preference pattern much more markedly : (a) The big peasants owning 60 acres or more, shows distinct preferences for tenants having 2.5 acre or less. Within this class of tenants they

Table 4.3 : Frequency Distribution of Lease Units
According to Lessee-Lessor Group -
All Villages (No.)

	Landlord (Ownership Holding)							Total
	0.00- 5.0	5.0- 10.0	10.0- 15.0	15.0- 20.0	20.0- 40.0	40.0- 60.0	60.0 +	
0.00 - 2.5	9 (5)	21 (16)	2 (11)	10 (1)	10 (8)	3 (7)	19 (41)	74 (89)
2.5 - 5.0	11	12 (2)	6 (3)	-	3	6 (2)	19 (2)	57 (9)
5.0 - 7.5	10	5	2	1	3	-	2	23
7.5 - 10.0	-	3	-	-	-	-	9	11
10.0 - 15.0	-	1	-	-	5	2	2	10
Total	30 (5)	41 (18)	10 (14)	11 (1)	21 (8)	11 (9)	51 (43)	175 (98)

Figures in the bracket indicate pure tenants

prefer pure tenants (i.e. landless tenants) more than owner tenants. Next in their preference comes the tenants having 2.5 to 5.0. But within this category the big lessors give more units to the owner tenants - 19 out of 21 - and the remaining 2 to the pure peasants. This lessor group give 2 units to tenants within 5.0 to 7.5 acres, 9 to tenants within 7.5 to 10.0 acres and 2 to 10.0 to 15.0 acres. The other groups of big lessors show same preference pattern between tenants of various classes and also between owner tenants and pure tenants within each classes of tenants with two exception : (a) The lessors with 20.0 to 40.0 acres, while showing preference for small tenants like other big peasants, prefer owner tenants to pure tenants. This lessor group gives 10 lease units to the owner tenants and 8 to the pure tenants. This is also true for big peasants with 15.0 to 20.0 acre. (b) The lessors with 20.0 to 40.0 acres also shows greater preferences for big tenants. The number of lease units given to the big tenants by this group of lessors is 5 out of 9 lease units given by all the big peasants to the big tenants (with more than 10 acres of operational holding).

The village-wise distribution of lease units have been given in tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. There is significant differences in the prevalence or otherwise, of the different

Table 4.4 : Frequency Distribution of Lease Units
According to Lessee-Lessor Group-
Raghuni Dehat (No.)

Tenant (Operational Holding)	Landlord (Ownership Holding)							Total
	0.00- 5.0	5.0- 10.0	10.0- 15.0	15.0- 20.0	20.0- 40.0	40.0- 60.0	60.0 +	
0.00 - 2.5	1 (4)	5 (14)	(10)	3	9 (9)	2	5 (6)	25 (43)
2.5 - 5.0	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
5.0 - 7.5	5	2	2	-	3	-	-	12
7.5 - 10.0	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
10.0 - 15.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	6 (4)	10 (14)	2 (10)	3	12 (9)	2	6 (6)	41 (43)

Figures in the bracket indicate pure
tenants.

Table 4.5 : Frequency Distribution of Lease Units According to Lessee-Lessor Group-Baghnagri (No.)

Tenant (Operational Holding)	Landlord(Ownership Holding)							Total
	0.00- 5.0	5.0- 10.0	10.0- 15.0	15.0- 20.0	20.0- 40.0	40.0- 60.0	60.0- +	
0.00 - 2.5	1	2	-	-	-	-	8 (14)	11 (14)
2.5 - 5.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	12
5.0 - 7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7.5 -10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10.0 -15.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	1	2	-	-	-	-	20 (14)	23 (14)

Figures in the bracket indicate pure tenants.

Table 4.6 : Frequency Distribution Lease
Units According to Lessee-Lessor
Group-Dhima (No.)

Tenant (Operational Holding)	Landlord (Ownership Holding)							Total
	0.00- 5.0	5.0- 10.0	10.0- 15.0	15.0- 20.0	20.0- 40.0	40.0- 60.0	60.0 +	
0.00 - 2.5	- (1)	1	-	3	-	-	1 (10)	5 (11)
2.5 - 5.0	6	- (2)	-	-	-	6	2 (1)	14 (3)
5.0 - 7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7.5 - 10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	8
10.0 - 15.0	-	1	-	-	5	2	2	10
Total	6 (1)	2 (2)	-	3	5	8	13 (11)	37 (14)

Figures in the bracket indicate pure
tenants.

Table 4.7 : Frequency Distribution of Lease Units According to Lessee-lessor Group-Maina Tarr (NO.)

Tenants (Operational Holding)	Landlords (Ownership holding)							Total
	0.00- 5.0	5.0- 10.0	10.0- 15.0	15.0- 20.0	20.0- 40.0	40.0- 60.0	60.0 +	
0.00 - 2.5	-	-	-	-	-	1 (7)	- (11)	1 (18)
2.5 - 5.0	-	2	- (3)	-	-	- (2)	- (1)	2 (6)
5.0 - 7.5	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	7
7.5 - 10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10.0 - 15.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	4	5	- (3)	-	-	1 (5)	- (12)	10 (24)

Figures in the bracket are pure tenants.

Table 4.8 : Frequency Distribution of Lease Units According to Lessee-Lessor Group-Biddhipur (No.)

Tenants (Operational Holding)	Landlords (Ownership holding)							Total
	0.00- 5.0	5.0- 10.0	10.0- 15.0	15.0- 20.0	20.0- 40.0	40.0- 60.0	60.0 +	
0.00 - 2.5	7	13 (12)	2 (1)	4 (1)	1	-	5	32 (4)
2.5 - 5.0	5	10	6	-	3	-	4	28
5.0 - 7.5	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	3
7.5 -10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10.0 -15.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	12	23 (2)	8 (1)	5 (1)	4	-	11	63 (4)

Figures in the bracket indicate pure tenants.

classes of tenants taking leases in different village : (a) The small tenants are present in all the villages. In Baghnagri all the 37 leased units have been taken by the small tenants (below 5.0 acres of operation holding). Actually 25 out of this 37 have gone to the lowest group of tenants (table 4.5). Of these 14 are pure tenants. In Biddhipur the small tenants (below 2.5 acres) have taken 36 out of 67 total lease units (4 being pure tenants) and those with 2.5 to 5.0 acre land have taken 28 lease units (all owner tenants) i.e. about 95 per cent of total units of land leased out. 3 are owner tenants of the middle category. In Raghani Dehat 68 out of 84 units have been leased in by these tenants. The pure tenants (with little or no land) take most of them. The tenants with 2.5 to 5.0 acres of land take only 2 units. In Maina Taur too the pattern is similar. The smallest group of lessees takes the largest number of leases - 19 out of 34 total. Those lessees with 2.5 to 5.0 acres account for 8 only. Relatively speaking in Dhima the small tenants take larger number of leases - 33 units out of 51 i.e. almost 63 per cent. The smallest group of tenants takes 16 and those with 2.5 - 5.0 acre takes 17 units. (b) In Baghnagri there are no middle or big tenants taking any leases. In Biddhipur they account for only 3 lease units out of 67 total units leased in. In Raghani Dehat the middle tenants (5.0-10.0 acres) have leased in 14 plot out of 84 i.e. almost 17 per cent of the plots leased out. Raghani

Dehat has no big tenants (10.0-15.0 acre). In Maina Tonr also there are no big tenants. It has, however, middle tenants in the class of 5.0 to 7.5 acres. They have taken 4 plots from the small peasants and 3 from the middle peasants. In Dhima, on the other hand, we find a number of big tenants. They have leased in 9 plots from the big lessors and 1 from the middle group of lessors. (c) The major group of lessors are obviously the big peasants in all the villages. Among them again those with 60 acres or more land are the largest group in all village except Reghuni Dehat. In Reghuni Dehat the lessors with 20 to 40 acres of land are the largest group. They have leased out 21 plots altogether, 18 of which to the small tenants and 3 to the middle tenants with 5.0 to 7.5 acres (Table 4.4). (d) The middle and small peasants too lease out land and they lease out mostly to the small and middle group of tenants. Their largest concentration is in Reghuni Dehat. There the peasants have leased out 24 plots, 20 to the small tenants and 4 to the middle (table 4.4). Their number is lowest in Baghnagri. There they have leased 3 plots in all - all to the poor tenants (table 4.5). In Dhima the number of plots leased out by the middle peasants are 4, 3 of which to the small tenants, and 1 to the big tenants. The small peasants have leased out 7 all together to the poor tenants only (table 4.6). In Biddhipur the number of plots leased out by the

middle and poor peasants are 25 and 12 respectively. All these have been given to the poor tenants (table 4.8). In Baghnagri these classes have leased out 2 and 1 respectively, all again to the poor tenants (table 4.5).

The distribution of lease units show the extent of participation of various lessor-lessee groups in the lease market. Thus it shows the major lessor groups are the big peasants who lease out mostly to the small tenants. It also shows that the middle and poor peasants too lease out and in many cases they have leased out to the bigger tenants. But in order to appreciate fully the involvement of these lessor-lessee groups it might be worthwhile to find out the quantum of land offered by these classes for lease. In table 4.9 the distribution of leased area by various lessee-lessor groups have been given. It shows the big peasants lease out maximum land. If we take all those peasants having more than 10 acres, the total land lease out by this group of lessors are 74 acres which is 73 per cent of the land transacted in the lease markets of the five villages. The biggest of these big group, i.e. those having 60 acres or more, has leased out 45 acres out of 74 acres, i.e. 44 per cent of the land leased by the entire group. This lessors lease mostly to the small tenants (below 5.0 acres operational holding)- 50 acres out of 74 acres total land leased out. To the middle group they have leased out 13 acres out of 74 acres. They lease out to the bigger tenants also. But it

is much less than that given to the small tenants - only 11 acre. The middle group of lessors lease out too. And, like the big ones, they too lease out mostly to the small ones. Out of 19 acres leased out by this group 16 acres have gone to the small group of tenants. To the middle and the big tenants also this group have 2 acres and .5 acres of land. On the other hand, the small lessors lease out mainly to the poorer groups of lessees. They have leased out to the poor tenants 7 acre and to the middle group (5.0-7.5 acres only) 2 acres. They do not lease out to the big ones.

The village-wise distribution of leased area between various lessee-lessor groups have been given in tables 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14. In Raghuni Dehat the pattern is somewhat different than the general. In this village the big lessors have leased out 9 acres altogether and that again mostly to the lowest lessee groups (below 5.0 acre) (table 4.10). To the middle groups of tenants they have leased out 1.42 acres and to the big one nothing. However, in this village the middle group of lessors are important. The total land leased out by them is 5 acres. The maximum of this have gone to the small tenants - 4 acres - and the remaining 1 acre to the middle groups of tenants. In Baghmagri, on the other hand, the dominance of the biggest lessor groups (10.0 acres or more) is clearly evident (table 4.11). Out of 14 acres transacted in the lease market, the big peasants have leased out 13 acres and all

to the small tenants (below 5.0 acres). The middle and small peasants have insignificant share in the lease market. They have leased out .87 and .86 acre to the small and the middle tenants respectively. As in the case of lease units in Dhima, the lessor group is dominated by the big peasants and there is also larger presence of big tenants in this village (table 4.12). Out of 35 acres of total land leased out in the village, the big lessors have accounted for 29 acres, i.e. 81 per cent of the total leased out land. And, out of this 29 acres, the big tenants have taken 11 acres which is 38 per cent of the land leased out by the big ones. Among the big ones again the biggest group dominates. The small and the middle group of lessors lease out 4 acres and 2 acres respectively to the small tenants only. In Maina Tonr (Patna District) in the lessor groups, the big peasants dominate, leasing out 9 acre out of a total of 14 acres, i.e. 69 per cent of the land leased out. They lease out only to the small tenants (Table 4.13). In this village, the middle group of lessors lease out too. The total land leased out by them is 3 acres of which 2 acres goes to the small tenants and 1 to the middle. The small peasants lease out a negligible .9 acre to the middle ranking tenant with 5.0 to 7.5 acres of operational holding. In Biddhipur the leasing pattern resembles Maina Tonr by and large (Table 4.14). In this village the big

Table 4.9 : Frequency Distribution of Leased
Area According to Lessee-Lessor Group
All Village (Acre)

Tenant (Operational Holding)	Landlord (Ownership holding in acre)							Total
	0.00- 5.00	5.00- 10.0	10.00- 15.0	15.0- 20.0	20.0- 40.0	40.0- 60.0	60.0 +	
0.00 - 2.5	2.91	10.17	2.21	3.54	2.92	2.03	23.17	46.95
2.5 - 5.0	4.31	6.12	3.71	-	.70	3.43	8.06	26.33
5.0 - 7.5	1.97	1.6	-40	.91	1.02	-	-	5.06
7.5 -10.0	-	.58	-	-	-	-	10.8	11.38
10.0 -15.0	-	.62	-	-	7.00	-63	3.15	11.4
Total	9.19	19.09	6.32	4.45	11.64	6.09	45.18	101.96

Table 4.10 : Frequency Distribution of Leased Area According to Lessee-Lessor Group-Raghuni Dehat (Acre)

Tenant (Operational Holding)	Landlord (Ownership holding in acre)							Total
	0.00- 5.00	5.00- 10.0	10.00- 15.0	15.0- 20.0	20.0- 40.0	40.0- 60.0	60.0 +	
0.00 - 2.5	.57	3.56	1.33	.69	2.67	.54	2.25	11.61
2.5 - 5.0	-	.31	-	-	-	-	.31	.62
5.0 - 7.5	1.04	.66	.40	-	1.02	-	-	3.12
7.5 - 10.0	-	.58	-	-	-	-	-	.58
10.0 +	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	1.61	5.11	1.73	1.71	2.67	.54	2.56	15.93

Table 4.11 : Frequency Distribution of Leased Area
According to Lessee-Lessor Group-
Baghmagri (Acra)

Tenant (Operational Holding in acre)	Landlord (Ownership holding in acre)							Total
	0.00- 5.00	5.00- 10.0	10.00- 15.0	15.00- 20.00	20.00- 40.00	40.00- 60.00	60.00 +	
0.00 - 2.5	.87	.86	-	-	-	-	8.13	9.86
2.5 - 5.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.54	4.54
5.0 - 7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7.5 - 10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10.0 +	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	.87	.86	-	-	-	-	12.67	14.4

Table 4.12 : Frequency Distribution of Leased Area
Lessee-Lessor Group-Dhima (Acre)

Tenant (Operational Holding Acre)	Landlord (Ownership holding in acre)							Total
	0.00- 5.0	5.0- 10.0	10.00- 15.00	15.00- 20.00	20.00- 40.00	40.00- 60.00	60.00 +	
0.00 - 2.5	.42	.62	-	.65	-	-	6.07	7.76
2.5 - 5.0	3.7	1.24	-	-	-	1.49	1.10	7.53
5.0 - 7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7.5 -10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.5	8.5
10.0 +	-	.62	-	-	7.0	.63	3.15	11.4
Total	4.12	2.48	-	.65	7.0	2.12	18.82	35.19

Table 4.13 : Frequency Distribution of Leased Area
According to Lessee-Lessor Group-
Maina Tanr (Acre)

Tenant (Operational Holding in Acre)	Landlord (Ownership holding in eacre)								Total
	0.00- 5.00	5.00- 10.00	10.00- 15.00	15.00- 20.00	20.00- 40.00	40.00- 60.00	60.00 +		
0.00 - 2.5	-	-	-	-	-	1.49	4.28		5.77
2.5 - 5.00	-	2.34	1.23	-	-	1.84	.63		6.04
5.0 - 7.5	.93	.94	-	-	-	-	.		1.87
7.5 -10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-
10.0 +	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-
Total	.93	3.28	1.23	-	-	3.33	4.91		13.68

Table 4.14 : Frequency Distribution of Leased Acre
According to Lessee-Lessor Group-
Biddhipur (Acre)

Tenant (Operational Holding in Acre)	Landlord (Ownership holding in acre)							Total
	0.00- 5.00	5.00- 10.00	10.00- 15.00	15.00 20.00	20.00- 40.00	40.00 60.00	60.00 +	
0.00 - 2.5	1.47	4.3	0.88	2.2	.25	-	2.87	11.97
2.5 - 5.0	.61	2.47	2.48	-	.71	-	1.48	7.75
5.0 - 7.5	-	-	-	.91	-	-	2.3	3.04
7.5 -10.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10.0 +	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	2.08	6.77	3.36	3.14	.96	-	6.45	22.76

groups of lessors lease out 14 acres of land out of a total of 23 acres, i.e. 61 per cent of the total land transacted. Excepting 3 acres which goes to the tenants in 5.0 to 7.5 acre group, all of these lands - remaining 11 acre - have been leased out to the small tenants. The middle and the small lessors of Biddhipur have leased out 7 acres and 2 acres respectively to the small tenants (below 5.0 acres) only. From the above discussion, the following characteristics of lease market in the five villages emerges : (a) The most important groups of lessors are the big peasants (10.0 or more acre), particularly the bigger ones among them (e.g. those owning 50.0 acre or more). These lessors prefer to lease out to the smaller tenants (below 5.0 operational holding), particularly those have 2.5 acres or less. This includes both owner tenants and pure tenants, i.e. those tenants who are either landless or have inadequate land holding. To stress this point more clearly we have shown the leased unit going to the tenants arranged according to their ownership holding in table 4.15. It shows that 241 out of 273 lease units have gone to the tenants owning 2.5 acres or less and 17 to those own 2.5 to 5.0 acres. Only 15 plots have gone to the tenants owning 5.0 - 7.5 acres. In Dhima only we find some of these big lessors leasing out land to the big tenants. (b) The middle peasants also shows

Table 4.15 : Frequency Distribution of Lease Units
According to Lessee-Lessor (ownership
holding)-All Villages (No.)

Tenant (Ownership Holding in Acre)	Landlord (Ownership Holding in Acre)							Total
	0.00- 5.00	5.00- 10.00	10.00- 15.00	15.00- 20.00	20.00- 40.00	40.00- 60.00	60.00 +	
0.00 - 2.5	25	49	19	12	26	18	92	241
2.5 - 5.00	5	3	3	-	2	2	2	17
5.0 - 7.5	7	3	2	-	1	--	--	13
7.5 -10.0	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
10.0 +	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	37	57	24	12	29	20	94	273

preference for small tenants though they have leased out to the middle group of tenants also, particularly in Raghuni Dehat. (c) The small groups of lessors have leased out to the small tenants. Only in Maina Tenr and Raghuni Dehat they lease out to the middle groups of tenants. (d) Obviously in the lessee group the small tenants predominate. Only in Dhima we find some tenants in the bigger groups leasing in land from the big peasants.

While enquiring into the characteristics of lease market we also tried to find out the reasons for leasing out by various groups of lessors and also their reasons for preferring certain categories of lessees. The responses we got have been presented in nine broad categories for five villages separately in table 4.16. The responses of various groups of lessees in order of their importance are : (a) "the plot is away from the residence"; (b) "not sufficient manpower in the family"; (c) "engaged in business/service"; and (d) "more lucrative to lease out". The most important factor is, of course, the distance of the plot from the lessors house. This is a legacy of the nature of land ownership in North Bihar, which is marked by extreme concentration and fragmentation of holding. The land reform and the land consolidation act has not changed this reality. The other important factor for leasing out is the out-migration. This is particularly

Table 4.16 : Reasons for Leasing Out : Frequency of Responses.

Reasons	Raghuni- Dehat	Bagh- nagri	Dhima	Biddhi- pur	Maina- Tanr	Total
1. 'More Lucrative to Lease out'	3	3	-	3	3	12
2. 'Not Sufficient Man-power in the Family'	9	-	6	6	5	26
3. 'Financial Difficulty to carry out Cultivation'	-	-	3	-	-	3
4. 'Plot is Away From the Residence'	9	-	20	6	6	41
5. 'No Farming Experience'	4	3	-	-	-	7
6. Traditionally & Landlord(Caste)	2	-	2	2	2	8
7. Physically Handicapped or a Widow	1	-	-	1	1	3
8. Engaged In Business/Service	4	-	6	3	6	19
9. Other	-	-	-	-	-	-

important for the upper castes - Brahmins and Kayasthas especially - who are migrating to the urban areas for jobs. In recent times some of the backward castes are also showing this tendency. We found that the caste and absentee landlordism, which once were the primary reasons for leasing out land, does not play any role now.

In table 4.17 we have shown the lessee groups preferred by the lessors. The most preferred groups of lessees are the landless labourers and the poor peasants. Some of the poorer groups of lessors prefer labourers with implements as they themselves are sometimes short of implements. Those lessors who live outside the village often prefer poor peasants who pay regularly. The widows particularly prefer this type of lessees while leasing out their land.

Table 4.17 :

Preferences to	Raghuni- Dehat	Bagh- nagri	Dhima	Maina Tehr	Biddhi- pur	Total
Labourers	3	-	15	6	6	30
Labourers with implements	6	-	6	-	-	12
Poor Peasants	6	-	12	7	12	37
Poor peasants who pay regularly	9	-	-	6	6	21
Prefer caste	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-

The reasons for this preference pattern are varied. We asked these questions to lessees and lessors both. While the lessors in most cases parried the question, the lessees articulated more sharply their sentiments. We quote some of them below :

1. Behari Ram, owning .11 acre in Biddhipur, who has taken land from Gajjan Jha, a Brahmin owning 6 acres says :
"Land is leased out to me because I work in my landlords land also".
2. Sitaram Paswan, a Dusadh owning .07 acres in Raghuni Dehat, who has taken land from Ghuron Raut owning 4.5 acres says :
"Landlord has agreed to give land as 'batai' to me after I became his attached labourer".
3. Rambalak Singh, Shumihar, owning 5.4 acres in Biddhipur says :
"Land is given to the lower caste tenants as they work in the landlords land also. "In most cases the tenants also work as 'halwas'".
4. Bindeswari Das, a landless in Biddhipur who is a tenant of Sadri Singh, owning 18 acres in the same village says :
"I work as casual labourer in Sadri Singh's farm".
5. Tanik Gope, a Yadav owning .4 acre in Biddhipur, who has taken land from Ramji Singh, owning 70 acres and also Kamo Singh, owning 14 acres, both of Biddhipur, says :
"I have to work for Kamo Singh and often lend my cart to both. It (cart) is given as free, they only give me food for driving it".

6. Ramdip Singh, owning 5 acres in Maina Tonr, who has given land to Sibdutt Singh, a poor peasant-tenant of the same village says :

"Earlier I used to given to Panchu Mistri. But now I given to Sibdutt Singh as he is hardworking".

7. Mahendra Jha, a Brahmin owning 6 acres in Raghuni Dehat, who has land from Mahi Jha, having 6 acres in the same village, says :

"Mahi Jha gives me land for sharecropping for wheat cultivation as I am a good wheat cultivator".

8. Badri Das, a Yadav owner-tenant of Biddhipur, owning .59 acre says :

"Outsiders are preferred in 'batai' and 'naadi' as they cannot take away the crop".

9. Harinandan Jha, a Brahmin owning .71 acre in Baghnagri says :

"The landlords have caste preference. They prefer those caste who work harder".

These peasants speak for themselves . One only briefly notes their points. The landless peasants are preferred as lessees as they can also work as 'halwas'. To the owner tenants it ('halwai') is still a degradation. They do not go for it easily. Often the readiness to accept a 'halwai' job becomes a condition for getting the tenancy for these landless tenants. Frequently, the lessees have to work unpaid. Not only they have to work in the households of the lessors but also in their field, doing such work as building 'bund', making 'muri' without any payments. If the lessee has a cart or a rickshaw or a tontom they are often requisitioned for service by the lesser. Nothing is paid for that. Neither does lessee get anything for his service as driver. He get only food for driving the cart, etc. If the lessee has implements, those

have to be brought to the landlords land for use. If his lessor is a big peasant he (the lessee) usually does not get anything for letting out his implements to the lessor. But if the lessee uses lessor's implements, which the former often has to do less endowed as he is in terms of implements, he has to pay it back in the form of labour at the rate of 1:2 i.e. for one days use of plough he has to work 2 days in the lessors field. Sometimes the lessors prefer those lessees who are known for their hardwork. Sometimes they choose tenants on the basis of their expertise in producing certain crops which they (the lessors) want to be grown in their leased-in land.

Thus far, therefore, our discussion is focussed on the question who leases to whom, emphasising the extent and preference pattern of the leases between various lessor-lessee groups. In what follows we discuss various forms of tenancies and their conditions .

The sharecropping is the most dominant form of tenancy. It has been made illegal in Bihar by an act of legislature. But it is still omnipresent. What we are discussing, therefore, is the real relations which have no corresponding juridical forms. The conditions of sharecropping - locally known as 'batai' - show infinite variation. But it has certain general features. The crop is usually shared fifty-fifty between lessor and lessee. This share is fixed by tradition. (There are however, some varia-

tions in it to which we return later). Everything is shared. Not only the main crop but also the secondary crops, if any, the subsidiary crops (e.g. 'khesri', usually grown with other crops), the byproducts - e.g., straw, 'bhusa' etc. - and even such things as firewood, are shared half by the landlord. But, in fact, this fifty per cent share is misleading. In actual practice the lessee might have to pay more. The deductions could be in many forms. Besides consumption and production loans - and the practice of taking loans from the lessor is universal - there are such deductions as weighing charges, costs of using bullocks, etc. Further, the lessee has to perform many underpaid and unpaid labour which are not always so obvious. For the use of bullocks or plough in his field the lessee has to work in the lessor's land at the rate of 2:1 i.e., for one days use of lessor's plough or bullock he has to work two days in the lessors field. (The rate is 1:1 if he takes it from another poor peasant). He also has to work in lessor's land as casual labour in less wages and/or as 'halwas'. The willingness to do such work often becomes a pre-condition for the lease agreement. Then he also has to do such work as preparing bund or making 'muri' in the lessor's land on 'request' and that is invariably unpaid. Usually the lessors prefer lessees with larger family of women folks and

children who are particularly useful in harvesting work. But the plots given to them are small, which explain the high degree of efficiency and higher productivity of these leased-in plots. (See the table 4.21, 4.22, 4.23, 4.24, 4.25). It contains, therefore, an element of labour rent. The non-labour inputs in these plot are usually highly inadequate. The lessors usually do not share in ut costs, except in some specific cases and in certain crops in certain regions. But, in spite of this, the lessees go for leased land as they have no land and further, need loan - primarily consumption loan for their self-reproduction which they cannot procure easily from the landowners unless they (the lessees) lease in land from those landowners.

In Raghuni Dehat the dominant form of tenancy is share-cropping (Table 4.26, section II). This is primarily in paddy and sugarcane. The later crop is grown mainly by the middle tenants (5 to 10 acre of operational holding). (See the table 4.18). The gross productivity per acre of paddy is marginally higher in case of the middle tenants than in case of the poor and the landless in Raghuni Dehat (Table 4.18). The lessors stipulate the cultivation of this crop in most cases. The reasons are various. We asked both lessors and lessees whether the cultivation of the crop stipulated or not and the reasons for that. Some of the more articulated reply is quoted below :

Table 4.18 : Gross Productivity Per Acre of Leased Land - Raghuni Dehat, Baghnagri and Dhima

Tenants (Operational Holding)	<u>Raghuni Dehat</u>		<u>Baghnagri</u>	<u>Dhima</u>	
	<u>Paddy</u>	<u>Sugarcane</u>	<u>Paddy</u>	<u>Paddy</u>	<u>Jute</u>
	(Quintal)		(Quintal)	(Quintal)	
Below 5.0	6.1	-	6.5	2.6	1.7
5.0 - 10.0	6.3	1.7	-	3.2	2.82

Table 4.19 : Gross Productivity Per Acre of Leased Land - Biddhipur (Rs.)

Tenant (Operational Holding)	<u>Share Cropping</u>		<u>Fixed Cash</u>		<u>Fixed Kind</u>	
	<u>Gross</u>	<u>Rent</u>	<u>Gross</u>	<u>Rent</u>	<u>Gross</u>	<u>Rent</u>
	Output	Per cent	Output	Per cent	Output (Rs.)	Percent
Below 5.0	1800	50.0	2004	59.9	2476	54.9

- a. Jagdeo Safi, a pure tenant of Jorilal Jha, (150 acre), says :

"Jari babu gave lease to me as that would enable him to get back his loan. He asked me to grow paddy".

- b. Ghuran Raut (5 acre), an owner tenant of Kapil Raut (30 acre), says :

"Malik wants me to cultivate paddy as my paddy seeds are good".

- c. Panchkori Tanti, a landless, pure tenant of Kapil Raut (30 acre), says :

"Kapil Raut wants him to cultivate wheat".

- d. Shrikant Jha (6 acre), owner tenant of Gudri Raut (75 acre), and Balmiki Jha, (8 acre), says :

"Balmiki Jha asked me to grow wheat in his 8 'katha' land: as I owe good in wheat cultivation.

- e. Panchu Raut, an owner tenant of Jorilal Jha (150 acre) says :

"Jori Jha asked me to cultivate wheat in his 'batai' land".

- f. Rajdeo Jha, an owner tenant of Nanu Jha (50 acre), says:

"Malik' asked me to grow sugarcane and gave me land only when I agreed to do that".

These are some of the reactions of various lessee groups to our queries. We asked these questions to the lesser groups also. In Raghuni Dehat we found that the crop to be grown by the tenants are in many cases stipulated by the landlords. The reasons for

stipulating a particular crop are good seeds, or proficiency of the tenants in growing a particular crops etc. The land-owners do not, however, share any cost of production of the tenants. In many cases they give to the tenants such things as seed, fertilizer etc. but usually on loan. The usual interest is fifty per cent (see below on this point). None of the 'batal' land has water supply. The lessors share fifty per cent of the crop, by-product and all other things including 'bhuss'. In actual practice the lessees share is less than fifty per cent as there are many deduction which are not always easy to calculate. In Raghuni Dehat the landlords insist that the tenants have to take their crop to landlords 'khalian' (courtyard) first which makes it easier for him to enforce such deductions. Further, the tenants often have to do various odd jobs in the landlords 'khalians' unpaid, e.g. in helping him to shift the crops to the godown. The fact is that the pure tenants in Raghuni Dehat are also working as 'halwas' of the lessors - in fact, this is one of the conditions of getting lease - makes the relationship more complex. (The middle peasants do not have to do such work. But they often has to render such service as lending their cart, etc. free to their lessor). In 1976, at the wake of the Government legislations

prohibiting sharecropping, bonded labour, and usury, the tenants and 'haiwas' of Raghuni Dehat demanded fair share and refused to work unpaid. They also asked for minimum wages. The landlords retaliated brutally. They took away their land. The crop on the 'betail' land was harvested forcibly by the landlords. The supply of water, including drinking water, was stopped and the family of the tenants and labourers were barred from using the field and the pond for their daily chores. The tenants and the labourers went to the court. When we went to the village in 1980, after 4 years of the struggle the court cases were still going on.

In Baghnagri the situation is somewhat similar to Raghuni Dehat. The sharecropping is the usual form of tenancy in Baghnagri and it is mostly in paddy. No other crop is grown by the tenants. The gross productivity of this crop in Baghnagri is marginally higher than that in Raghuni Dehat (Table 4.18). The crop is stipulated in many cases. There is no irrigation for most of the tenants. The lessors do not share the input costs. Everything is shared by the lessors whose share again in actual practice is more than this conventionally fixed percentage. The tenants in Baghnagri are either poor peasants or landless. The latter in most cases work as

'halwas'. This interlinking enables the lessor-landlords to exploit them in various ways. As in Raghuni Dehat, in Baghnagri also the tenants and attached labourers asked for better wages and title to their land, in 1976 and went on strike. In the event the landowners sacked some of their attached labourers and took away their land. In case of Panjier, the biggest landowner of the village, however, the tenants were partially successful in getting their land title in some cases. Those who have got title to their land have stopped giving crop to the Panjiers. This was mainly due to the fact that the Panjiers do not stay in the village. They operate from the nearby Madhubani village. The strike has important impact on the Panjiers also. He told us that he now wants to stay in the village and start cultivating farm with the help of daily labour and tractor. Further, he said, he wants to stop leasing out. His reasons for this are that the sharecropping is not productive enough and the law creates trouble.

In Dhima (Purnea), while the tenancy system is largely similar to that in Raghuni Dehat and Baghnagri, we found some important differences. The crop grown by the tenants in Dhima are paddy and jute. It is grown by both the poor tenants and the middle tenants. But the gross productivity of crops in Dhima is much lower than that in Raghuni Dehat and Baghnagri for both poor tenants and middle tenants (Table 4.18). This is mainly

due to the fact that the land given in tenancy are in low area and water-logged. This has resulted in unusual growth of weeds and has made the crop vulnerable to the pests. The terms and conditions of tenants are same as in Raghuni Dehat and Baghnagri. The crops are stipulated in many case; no cost sharing exists; the lessors share half of everything produced, including by-products. But some important differences also have emerged in the tenancy conditions in Dhima. In Dhima there exists no interlinking of tenants and 'halwas' and, like Raghuni Dehat and Baghnagri, the acceptance of 'haiwai' job is seldom made a condition for giving lease lesser to a tenant. This is because the ploughing in Dhima - for which 'halwas' are primarily kept - is done by tractors by most of the landlords in Dhima. In Dhima we also found a few big tenants going for capitalist type of farming employing outside labour. These peasants give 25 per cent of their main crop and straw to the lessors (see 9th column of the table 4.23). They do not give any share of their second and subsidiary crops. They decide their own cropping pattern. Their per acre gross output is also high. Excepting this few instances, however, the general mass of tenants are indigent farmers like their counterpart in Raghuni Dehat and Baghnagri. These tenants in Dhima are mostly 'sikmidars'. These 'sikmidars' are those tenants who have been registered as tenants in the 1952 land survey in Purnea. Under the law, they are required to pay one-fourth of their produce to

their lessors against receipts. But most of them are still giving half without any receipt. In 1975 some of them had been given title to their land title. But in 1980-81, when we surveyed the village, they were still cultivating their land as share-croppers giving fifty per cent of their produce to their lessors. Some of them were even ejected from their land forcibly by their landlord for the purpose of self-cultivation.

In Maina Tonr and Biddhipur (both of Patna district) the Fixed Kind Rent and Fixed Cash Rent have appeared side by side with the sharecropping. The sharecropping is, of course, still there. It is mostly practiced in paddy and wheat crops in Main Tonr. In Maina Tonr the terms and conditions of sharecropping is somewhat different from Raghuni Dehat, Baghnagri and Dhima. The practice of stipulating the crop by the lessor is almost universal here. The lessors always share half of the (canal) water rate. In some case the landlords also bear part of the costs of fertiliser whose use is fairly widespread even among the tenants in Maina Tonr. This practice of cost sharing is particular evident in case of those lessors who stay outside the village or in case of those for whom agriculture is not the only occupation. The lessors take half of everything - main crop, subsidiary crop, by-products etc., and make the tenants, who are sometimes his halwas, to do various kinds of farm and

non-farm jobs without any wage. In Main Tonn in recent times the Fixed Kind system has become popular. It has spread very fast after the anti-sharecropping legislations. It is mostly practised in HYV wheat crop. Usually those groups of lessors who does not stay in the village and these middle peasants who does other work prefer to give their land in fixed kind system. We found only one big landowner - who is also a political leader and has other businesses has given land in fixed kind system. The lessors usually prefer poor tenants who are known for their hardwork. But there are some middle peasants in Maina Tonn who have taken land from landowners staying outside or are doing other work. In fixed kind system the landowners share not only water costs -usually half of it but also the cost of seeds and fertilizer. Their rate is not always fixed. The gross productivity per acre in fixed kind system is much higher than the sharecropping system. But the rent per acre in fixed kind system is also higher (Table 4.20). The gross productivity of the poor tenants in fixed kind system is lower than the middle tenants. Their per acre gross productivity in sharecropping is also lower than that of the middle peasants. But the rent in their case is also lower under the fixed kind system. But the lease period under the fixed kind system is usually short. Usually it is yearly, contracted in the month of 'jeth'. In some

cases, particularly in case of bigger lessors, it is even for one crop. Thus the little gain that the lessees get in term of cost sharing and higher productivity (due to better technology) is appropriated through higher rent and quicker lease turn over.* Some of these poor tenants are 'halwas' like those in previous three villages and like their counterparts there, they too do domestic work in their 'maliks' home without payment.

In Biddhipur also in recent times the fixed cash system and in some crops - 'dhania'- fixed kind system has appeared side by side with the sharecropping. In Biddhipur, the sharecropping is practiced in case of paddy and wheat. The fixed cash system is found in tomato primarily and also in wheat. The fixed kind is practiced in case of 'dhania' and chillies (locally known as 'mircha'). In sharecropping the lessors usually share half of the water cost. In some cases they also share other input costs also. The lessors share fifty per cent of everything that is produced by the tenant. But as in other villagers, in Biddhipur ^{also} for there are many other deductions which make the actual share of the tenants much less. Further, there are considerable unpaid labour which these tenants - some of whom are also 'halwas'- have to do in their lessor-cum employers farm. The fixed cash system is usually found in tomato. The fixed kind system is given in 'dhania' mainly.

* The situation is similar to that K. Bhardwaj and P.K. Das found in Orrissa village. See Bhardwaj and Das, P.K., Tenural Conditions and Modes of Exploitation- A Study of Some Bihar Villages; EPW, Annual No.1 Feb.1975 and R.A. Jan.1975.

Table 4.20 : Gross Productivity Per Acre of
Leased Land - Maina Tanr

	Share Cropping		Fixed Kind	
	Gross Output (Quintal)	Rent (Percent)	Gross Output (Quintal)	Rent (Percent)
Below 5.0	7.22	50	9.47	53
5.0-10.0	8.3	50	9.82	63

Both these two systems are relatively recent. All groups of lessors lease out land in these two types of tenancies. But the lessees are mainly from the smaller groups - less than 5 acres of operational holding (Table 4.25). In both these two types the lessors share water and other input costs. The rates of sharing these costs are extremely variable. The gross productivity per acre under the fixed cash is higher than sharecropping. But the rent is also high (Table 4.19). The gross productivity per acre in fixed cash system is higher than sharecropping but lower than the fixed kind system. But the rent under the later system is

lower than fixed cash but higher than sharecropping (Table 4.19). But, as in Maina Tonr, these two systems of tenancy are of shorter duration. The rent is usually renewed - almost invariably upward - annually. In case of fixed cash the rent is taken in advance. In case the tenants default it is treated as loan. The tenants have to pay interest for that. In many cases the poor lessors leasing out land under fixed cash system have become indebted in this manner.

In this relationship between lessors and lessees the indebtedness of the lessees to their lessors play a crucial role. Their indebtedness could originate from any source : a) the necessity for daily consumption; b) the need for inputs for production the failure to pay the lessor's share of crop, etc. But once contacted, this loan, and particularly its continuation, becomes an important lever of control for the economically more dominant lessors. In the tables 4.27, 4.28, 4.29 and 4.30, we have given information about which classes of lessees usually taking loans from which classes of lessors and also the rates of interest charged. We have not given separate information on consumption loans, production loan and loans arising out of the lessors failure to pay his rent. One reason for this is that the consumption loan is overwhelmingly the most important source of indebtedness. Further, and this

Table 4.27 : Frequency Distribution of Taken by Tenant Household From Various Classes of Landlords (No.)

	00.00- 5.00	5.00- 10.00	10.00- 15.00	15.00- 20.00	20.00- 40.00	40.00- 60.00	60.00 +	Total
I. Pure Tenants (Operational Holding)								
0.00 - 2.5	11	15	7	11	5	2	41	92
2.5 - 5.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
5.0 - 7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6
7.5 - 10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10.0 +	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
II. Owner Tenants								
0.00 - 2.5	17	26	6	-	10	-	28	87
2.5 - 5.0	3	3	5	-	5	-	16	32
5.0 - 7.5	12	-	-	-	5	-	13	30
7.5 - 10.0	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4
10.0 +	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6
III. Total	43	48	18	11	25	2	111	258

Table 4.28 : Frequency Distribution of Loans Per Tenant Household Taken From Various Classes of Landlords (Rs.)

	00.00- 5.00	5.00- 10.00	10.00- 15.00	15.00- 20.00	20.00-40.00- 40.00 60.00	60.00- +
I. Pure Tenants (Operational Holding)						
0.00 - 2.5	85	150.4	61.3	450.0	94.8	225
2.5 - 5.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
5.0 - 7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
7.5 - 10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
10.0 +	-	-	-	-	-	-
II. Owner Tenants						
0.00 - 2.5	298.2	489.0	1133.3	-	963.0	-
2.5 - 5.0	200.0	550.0	135.0	-	150.0	-
5.0 - 7.5	1054.0	-	-	-	1950.0	-
7.5 - 10.0	-	173.3	-	-	-	-
10.0 +	-	-	-	-	-	-
III. Total						
	432.7	353.1	435.0	450.0	826.7	187.5
						683.3

Table 4.29 : Frequency Distribution of Loans
According to Rates of Interest Charges
by Landlords to their Tenants (No.)

Landlords (Ownership Holding in Acre)	Rates of Interest (Percent)				Total
	Below 10	10- 25	25- 50	50+	
0.00 - 5.00	2	20	22	-	44
5.0 - 10.00	-	16	20	2	46
10.0 - 15.00	-	6	6	-	12
15.00 - 20.00	-	4	-	4	8
20.00 - 40.00	-	14	8	4	26
40.00 - 60.00	-	-	6	9	15
60.00 +	-	46	52	9	107
Total	2	106	122	28	258

Table 4.30 : Frequency Distribution of Loans According to the Rates of Interest Paid by Tenants. (No.)

	Below 10	10-25	25-50	50+	Total
I. Pure Tenants					
(Operational Holding)					
0.00 - 2.5	-	26	52	14	92
2.5 - 5.0	-	-	-	1	1
5.0 - 7.5	-	-	6	-	6
7.5 - 10.0	-	-	-	-	-
10.0 +	-	-	-	-	-
II. Owner Tenants					
0.00 - 2.5	-	36	38	13	87
2.5 - 5.0	-	20	12	-	32
5.0 - 7.5	2	22	6	-	30
7.5 - 10.0	-	-	4	-	4
10.0 +	-	2	4	-	6
Total	2	106	122	28	258

is applicable particularly for the poorer groups of lessees, all these loans essentially serves the purpose of providing these tenants their means for reproduction. In table 4.27 we have given the frequency distribution of loans taken by tenant households from the landlords. It shows that the pure tenants take loan mostly from the big landowners - 67 of 99 total loans taken. The middle and the poor landowners have also given loans to the pure tenants. But number of loans given by the middle and the poor landlords are only 11 and 15 respectively out of 99. The owner tenants also take loans primarily from the big landowners. The total number of loans taken by them are 94 out of 159 total. The middle landowners have given 29 and the poor 20 loans out of 159. The middle category tenants have taken loans from all categories of landowners. But in their case also the major source is the big landowners. The bigger tenants in our case have taken loans only from the big landowners. In order to appreciate more fully the nature and extent of indebtedness of various classes of tenants we have given in table 4.27 the amount of loans taken by various categories of tenants per household from various landowners. The pure tenants are greatly indebted to the big landowners. But they have also indebted to the poor and the middle peasants. The per family loan taken by these lower groups of pure tenants

from the poor and the middle landowners are Rs.85 and Rs.150. In actual practice we found that there is fairly close association between lease and loan for these groups of lessees. They have usually taken loans from their lessors. The situation is almost similar in case of the owner tenants. The rates of interest charged are usually between 10 to 50 per cent per annum (Table 4.28). The largest amount of loans are in the group of 25 to 50 per cent rates of interest - 122 out of 258 total loans. The next highest number of loans - 106 - are in the range of 10 to 25 per cent interest rates. Only 28 loans out of 258 have been given at 50 per cent or more rates of interest. The largest number of loans in this range of interest rates are from the big landowners. Only 2 out of 28 loans in this group are from the middle landowners. The middle and the poor landowners usually charge 10 to 50 per cent rates of interest. The pure tenants have been given loans mostly at the interest rates between 10 to 50 per cent per annum. (Table 4.29). This is also true about the owner tenants. But the bigger among the owner tenants usually get larger number of loans in the interest range of 10 to 25 per cent per annum. Out of 40 loans taken by them, 24 in the interest rate range of 10 to 25 per cent per annum, 2 in less than 10 per cent (from a poor landowner) and 14 in the range of over 50 per cent per annum.

In conclusion to this chapter we can note the following points : (a) The first question dealt with in this chapter is "who leases to whom". We found that the most important groups of lessors are the big peasants. They lease out mostly to the poor tenants - both pure and owner. The middle and the poor tenants also prefer the poor tenants though occasionally they lease out to the bigger tenants also. Both the distribution of lease units and the distribution of lease area in acre show this preference pattern. (b) The big peasants prefer poor tenants as the latter provide them with labour power cheaply either as 'halvag' or as casual labour. In many cases the willingness to work as 'halva' or as casual labour in the lessors' farm becomes a pre-condition for leasing out land to the lessee. Besides working in the lessor's farm in most cases the lessees have to work in the lessor's home as well or in his field without any work. Such ^{unpaid} ~~form~~ unpaid labour are not always obvious. The poor lessors prefer poor lessees with implements as the lessees themselves are often short of implements and often make use of lessees' implements. Those lessors who are widows or have migrated out of the villages they prefer lessees who pay regularly. (c) The share-cropping is the most usual form of tenancy. In sharecropping the landlords' share is fixed at traditional fifty per cent. The lessors take share in

everything - main crops, secondary crops subsidiary crops by-products etc. He does not share any part of the cost of production. The crop is stipulated. In most cases the actual share of the lessors is greater than the stipulated fifty per cent as there are unspecified number of deductions from the lessees' share. In case of bigger lessors such deductions are more. (d) In some villages the fixed kind rent and fixed cash rent have appeared. These farms of tenancies are practised mostly in the cash crops like tomatoes etc. In some cases it is practised in case of wheat and paddy also. In these tenancies the lessors share part of the cash and the crop is usually stipulated. The per acre gross productivity of the leased land under these farms of tenancies are higher. But the rent is also higher. Further, the duration of leases are shorter, usually not more than a year. The share of the lessors is usually raised at the end of each lease term. Thus the gain in production is neutralised by shorter duration and higher rent.

Table 4.21: Raghuni Dehat

Sl. No.	Tenants Operat- ional Holding	Landlords Ownership Holding	Size of Leased Parcel	Actual Rent Paid(Qt.) Paddy Sugar- cane	Rent Per Acre (Quintal) Paddy Sugar- cane	Rent as Proportion to Gross Output (Percent)		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	9.22	a) 8	.31	1.12	-	3.61	-	50
		b) 8	.27	.56	-	2.07	-	50
2.	6.26	a) 3.5	.27	1.12	-	4.15	-	50
		b) 3.5	.27	1.12	-	4.15	-	50
		c) 3.5	.27	.75	-	2.76	-	50
		d) 3.5	.09	.23	-	2.56	-	50
		e) 3.5	.14	.35	-	2.46	-	50
		f) 20.0	.27	.71	-	2.57	-	50
3.	7.43	a) 8	.36	-	.39	-	1.07	50
		b) 9	.27	-	.29	-	1.06	50
		c) 1.3	.2	-	.15	-	.75	50
		d) 1.3	.2	-	.14	-	.70	50
		e) 3.3	.27	-	.14	-	.50	50
4.	5.18	a) N.A.	.18	.75	-	4.14	-	50
		b) 30	.48	1.87	-	3.89	-	50
5.	4.87	a) 75	.31	1.2	-	3.87	-	50
		b) 8.6	.31	.26	-	.85	-	50
6.	1.32	a) 9.5	.22	.94	-	4.25	-	50
		b) 9.5	.04	.11	-	.25	-	50
		c) 9.0	.13	.41	-	3.07	-	50
7.	1.22	9.0	.38	.38	-	1.21	-	50
8.	2.10	a) 150	.18	.44	-	2.44	-	50
		b) 15	.48	1.16	-	2.42	-	50
		c) 27	.22	.55	-	2.5	-	50
		d) 20	.31	.76	-	2.45	-	50
		e) 6	.54	1.31	-	2.42	-	50
9.	.65	a) 75	.41	.52	-	1.27	-	50
10.	.71	a) 20	.08	.28	-	3.44	-	50
		b) 20	.08	.30	-	3.75	-	50
		c) 20	.22	1.26	-	5.72	-	50
		d) 20	.04	.15	-	3.75	-	50
		e) 4.5	.04	.05	-	1.25	-	50

Table 4.21(Contd.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
11.	.95	a) 20	.31	.38	-	1.21	-	50
	-	b) 20	.09	.11	-	1.27	-	50
		c) 8	.09	.37	-	4.11	-	50
		d) 5	.09	.30	-	3.33	-	50
		e) 4	.09	.36	-	4.00	-	50
		f) 4	.22	.73	-	3.32	-	50
12.	.46	a) 15	.08	.20	-	2.5	-	50
		b) 15	.13	.25	-	1.92	-	50
		c) 150	.13	.25	-	1.92	-	50
13.	.62	a) 20	.13	.38	-	2.89	-	50
		b) 20	.13	.47	-	3.59	-	50
		c) 20	.09	.05	-	.57	-	50
		d) 150	.09	.75	-	8.30	-	50
		e) 150	.09	-	-	.77	-	50
14.	.49	a) 4.5	.09	.15	-	1.67	-	50
		b) 4.5	.13	.45	-	3.46	-	50
		c) 6.0	.09	.14	-	1.57	-	50
		d) 6.0	.13	.55	-	4.23	-	50
15.	.26	a) 30	.13	.26	-	2.00	-	50
		b) 30	.13	.37	-	2.85	-	50
16.	.73	a) 150	.10	.64	-	3.56	-	50
		b) 150	.27	1.12	-	4.15	-	50
		c) 150	.27	1.00	-	3.7	-	50
17.	.69	a) 8	.18	.93	-	5.17	-	50
		b) 8	.18	.45	-	2.5	-	50
		c) 8	.27	1.20	-	4.44	-	50
		d) 8	1.05	.19	-	3.8	-	50
18.	.51	a) 150	.41	2.48	-	6.0	-	50
		b) 150	.08	.37	-	4.63	-	50
19.	1.08	a) 6	.27	.84	-	3.11	-	50
		b) 11	.27	.56	-	2.07	-	50
		c) 11	.27	.59	-	2.19	-	50
		d) 11	.09	.19	-	2.11	-	50
		e) 11	.09	.16	-	1.78	-	50
		f) 11	.04	.15	-	3.75	-	50
		g) 11	.04	.10	-	2.5	-	50

Table 4.21 (Contd.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
20.	.53	a) 12	.13	.92	-	7.08	-	50
		b) 12	.18	1.23	-	6.83	-	50
		c) 12	.16	.83	-	5.19	-	50
		d) 12	.06	.41	-	6.83	-	50
21.	.72	a) 30	.41	1.12	-	2.73	-	50
		b) 30	.13	.5	-	3.84	-	50
		c) 30	.13	.45	-	3.46	-	50
		d) 30	.04	.13	-	3.25	-	50
22.	.57	a) 8	.18	.94	-	5.22	-	50
		b) 8	.25	1.12	-	4.48	-	50
		c) 150	.14	.66	-	4.71	-	50
23.	.54	a) 7	.18	.9	-	5.00	-	50
		b) 7	.27	.94	-	3.48	-	50
		c) 7	.09	.40	-	4.44	-	50
24.	.61	a) 50	.27	.93	-	3.44	-	50
		b) 50	.27	.81	-	3.00	-	50

Table 4.22: Baghnagri

Sl. No.	Tenants Operational Holding (Acre)	Landlords Ownership Holding (Acre)	Size of Parcelled Land	Actual Rent Paid (Quintal)	Rent Per Acre (Quintal)	Rent As Proportion of Gross Output (Per cent)
1.	3.69	a) 125	.45	1.78	3.95	50
		b) 125	.22	.84	3.81	50
		c) 125	.27	.81	3.11	50
		d) 125	.40	1.31	3.28	50
2.	1.88	125	.45	1.12	3.33	50
3.	3.83	a) N.A.	.44	.94	2.13	50
		b) N.A.	.37	.81	-	-
		c) 125	.37	.75	2.01	50
		d) 125	.44	.94	2.13	30
		e) 125	.31	.65	2.11	50
		f) 125	.44	.94	2.13	50
		g) 125	.44	.94	2.13	50
		h) 125	.31	.75	2.40	50
4.	1.08	a) 3	.45	1.68	3.73	50
		b) 125	.22	.76	3.46	50
5.	.61	a) 6	.18	.56	5.10	50
		b) 6	.27	.94	3.47	50
6.	1.74	a) 125	.46	1.85	4.02	50
		b) 125	.22	.92	4.19	50
		c) 125	.26	1.10	4.23	50
		d) 125	.31	1.30	4.19	50
		e) 125	.36	1.40	3.68	50
7.	.91	a) 125	.45	1.66	3.69	50
		b) 125	.45	1.87	4.16	50
8.	.98	a) 125	.67	1.87	2.79	50
		b) 125	.22	.75	3.39	50
9.	.91	a) 125	.45	.93	2.07	50
		b) 125	.22	.56	2.54	50
		c) 125	.22	.37	1.85	50
10.	.68	125	.67	4.10	6.23	50
11.	1.75	a) 125	.89	4.10	4.61	50
		b) 125	.08	.32	3.96	50
		c) 125	.13	.48	3.69	50
		d) 125	.22	.79	3.59	50
		e) 125	.25	.95	3.81	50
		f) 125	.17	.63	3.71	50
12.	1.37	125	.31	.59	1.90	50

Table 4.23 : Dhima

Sl. No.	Tenant's Operational Holding (Acre)	Landlords Ownership Holding (Acre)	Size of Leased Parcel (Acre)	Actual Rent Paid (Qtls.)		Rent Per Acre (Qtls.)		Rent As Proportion of Gross Output (Percent)
				Paddy	Jute	Paddy	Jute	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	3.99	a)	83	.8	-	.75	-	.94
		b)	83	.3	1.12	-	3.73	-
		c)	42	.62	1.49	-	2.40	-
		d)	42	.5	.75	-	1.50	-
		e)	42	.5	.17	-	.34	-
		f)	42	.2	.19	-	.95	-
		g)	42	.75	.37	-	2.47	-
		h)	42	.12	.19	-	1.58	-
2.	12.66	a)	20	1.7	-	1.87	-	1.1
		b)	20	1.2	1.12	-	.93	-
		c)	20	1.7	1.12	-	.66	-
		d)	20	1.7	.47	-	.28	-
		e)	20	.7	.56	-	.80	-
		f)	83	1.9	1.12	-	.59	-
		g)	83	1.25	1.67	-	1.33	-
		h)	8	.62	-	.13	-	.21
		i)	42	.21	.94	-	4.48	-
		j)	42	.42	1.8	-	4.45	-
3.	9.22	a)	350	.7	.07	-	.10	-
		b)	350	.7	.06	-	.09	-
		c)	350	.7	.06	-	.09	-
		d)	350	.7	.07	-	.10	-
		e)	350	1.7	.56	-	.33	-
		f)	350	1.7	-	.37	-	.22
		g)	350	.04	.6	-	1.5	-
		h)	350	1.2	-	.19	-	.16
		i)	350	1.7	.11	-	.06	-
4.	4.02	a)	4	.9	-	.28	-	.31
		b)	4	.42	.28	-	.67	-
		c)	4	.42	.28	-	.67	-
		d)	4	.66	.44	-	.67	-
		e)	4	.2	.13	-	.65	-
		f)	4	1.1	.73	-	.66	-
5.	1.0	a)	95	.2	.19	-	.95	-
		b)	95	.3	.9	-	.30	-
		c)	95	.1	.8	-	.80	-
		d)	95	.2	-	.28	-	1.40
		e)	95	.2	.29	-	1.45	-

Table 4.23(Contd.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
6.	1.27	a) 93	.42	.19	-	.45	-	50
		b) 17	.29	-	.56	-	1.93	50
		c) 17	.24	.46	-	1.92	-	50
		d) 17	.12	.15	-	1.25	-	50
7.	.42	4	.42	.25	-	.60	-	50
8.	.29	250	.29	-	.28	-	.97	50
9.	.84	a) 95	.42	.37	-	.89	-	50
		b) 95	.42	.47	-	1.12	-	50
10.	3.42	a) 8	.62	.75*	-	-	-	50
		b) 250	2.18	2.24*	-	-	-	50
		c) 7	.62	2.24*	-	-	-	50
11.	1.34	a) 250	.67	.75*	-	-	-	50
		b) 250	.67	1.12*	-	-	-	50

*Do Not Pay Rent

Table 4.24 : Maina-Tanr

Sl. No.	Tenants Operational Holding (Acre)		Landowner's Ownership Holding (Acre)	Size of Leased Parcel (Acre)	Actual Rent Paid (Qtls.)		Rent Per Acre (Qtls.)		Rent As Proportion to Gross Output (Per-cent)
					Share-cropping system	Fixed Kind System	Share-cropping system	Fixed Kind System	
1	2		3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	.63	a)	.60	.31	.90	-	2.90	-	50.0
		b)	.60	.31	-	1.87	-	6.03	62.3
2.	.83	a)	60	.31	.81	-	2.61	-	50.0
		b)	60	.47	-	4.45	-	5.55	58.6
3.	.82	a)	60	.31	.70	-	2.26	-	50.0
		b)	60	.47	-	2.61	-	5.55	59.3
4.	.67	a)	60	.31	.68	-	2.19	-	50.0
		b)	60	.47	-	2.61	-	5.55	59.3
5.	5.33	a)	8	.31	-	1.88	-	6.06	62.7
		b)	8	.28	1.46	-	5.21	-	50.0
		c)	8	.16	.94	-	5.87	-	50.0
		d)	8	.09	.53	-	5.89	-	50.0
		e)	8	.09	.51	-	5.67	-	50.0
		f)	7.2	.41	.41	-	1.00	-	50.0
		g)	7.2	.22	1.31	-	5.95	-	50.0
		h)	9.1	.31	-	1.87	-	6.03	62.5
6.	2.87	a)	9	1.09	-	3.73	-	3.42	31.2
		b)	8	1.25	-	5.61	-	4.42	44.1
7.	1.24	a)	50	.19	-	1.02	-	5.37	45.5
		b)	50	.19	-	1.02	-	5.37	45.5
		c)	50	.16	-	.85	-	5.31	45.5
		d)	50	.16	-	.85	-	5.31	55.5
		e)	50	.09	-	.71	-	7.78	55.5
		f)	50	.09	-	.71	-	7.78	55.5
		g)	50	.2	-	2.40	-	8.00	58.5
8.	.44		44	.31	-	3.73	-	12.03	66.6
9.	3.73	a)	11	.15	-	.93	-	6.2	70.5
		b)	11	.05	-	.28	-	5.6	73.7
		c)	11	1.03	-	6.16	-	5.98	76.9
		d)	50	.01	-	4.85	-	5.98	62.2
		e)	50	1.03	-	6.53	-	6.33	59.4
		f)	114	.63	.21	-	.33	-	50.0
10.	.75	a)	114	.38	1.68	-	4.42	-	50.0
		b)	114	.31	1.87	-	6.03	-	50.0

Table 4.25: Biddhipur

Sl. No.	Tenants Operational Holding (Acre)	Landlords Ownership Holding (Acre)	Size of leased Parcel (Acre)	Actual Rent Paid		Rent Per Acre (Rs.)		Rent as Proportion of Gross Output
				Share-cropping (Qtls.)	Fixed Cash System (Rs.)	Share Cropping	Fixed Cash System	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	2.26	a)	18.9	.63	-	1600	-	54.1
		b)	70.56	.47	-	450	-	64.3
		c)	70.56	.16	-	253	-	59.3
2.	2.89	a)	21.4	.31	2	-	1394	50
		b)	13.7	.28	.56	-	432	50
		c)	13.7	.44	1.86	-	913	50
		d)	70.6	.15	-	125	-	56.1
		e)	5.0	.16	-	200	-	65.9
3.	1.72	a)	4.4	.31	2.61	-	1819	50.0
		b)	18.9	.31	-	550	-	78.6
		c)	18.9	.31	-	410	-	68.8
4.	2.39	a)	5.0	.23	1	-	864	50.0
		b)	5.0	.16	.63	-	845	50.0
		c)	5.0	.16	.63	-	845	50.0
		d)	5.0	.47	1.99	-	851	50.0
		e)	5.0	.31	1.25	-	870	50.0
		f)	5.0	.16	.63	-	851	50.0
		g)	5.0	.19	1.91	-	2171	50.0
5.	1.67	a)	70.7	.31	2.61	-	1819	50.0
		b)	13.9	.38	4.48	-	2547	50.0
		c)	5.0	.16	2.61	-	3523	50.0
		d)	5.0	.13	1.88	-	3124	50.0
		e)	5.0	.13	1.25	-	2077	50.0
		f)	94.5	.25	.47	-	1779	50.0
6.	3.42	a)	21.4	.31	-	200	-	59.3
		b)	21.4	.25	-	356	-	59.3
		c)	10.0	.69	3.38	-	1058	50.0
		d)	10.0	.69	1.49	-	466	50.0
		e)	10.0	.19	.94	-	1058	50.0
		f)	10.0	.19	.94	-	1058	50.0
		g)	5.0	.44	1.12	-	510	50.0
		h)	5.0	.13	.56	-	930	50.0
7.	2.25	a)	70.6	.31	.94	-	655	50.0
		b)	13.9	.31	.38	-	265	50.0
		c)	7.6	.31	.75	-	523	50.0
		d)	18.9	.17	.17	-	216	50.0
		e)	7.9	.25	1.49	-	1287	50.0
		f)	70.6	.25	Nil	-	-	Nil
		g)	70.6	.25	Nil	-	-	Nil

Table 4.25 (Contd.)

8.	1.83	a) 70.6	.81	.42	-	112	-	50.0
		b) 7.6	.62	.11	-	35	-	50.0
9.	2.9	a) 21.4	.25	1.50	-	1296	-	50.0
		b) .3	.13	1.50	-	2492	-	50.0
		c) .3	.07	.19	-	586	-	50.0
		d) .3	.19	.75	-	853	-	50.0
		e) .3	.09	.37	-	837	-	50.0
		f) 7.6	.14	-	320	-	2286	74.3
		g) 21.1	.14	-	275	-	1964	63.7
		h) .3	.13	-	240	-	1846	62.5
		i) 94.5	.47	-	946	-	2013	65.7
		j) 94.5	.22	-	672	-	3055	52.8
		k) 70.6	.63	-	1260	-	2000	65.6
10.	.37	a) 6.9	.19	-	430	-	2526	53.3
		b) 19.9	.09	-	225	-	2500	56.3
		c) 6.9	.09	-	225	-	2500	56.3
11.	1.39	a) 7.9	.47	1.50	-	639	-	50.0
		b) 15.1	.38	.15	-	35	-	50.0
		c) 4.4	.13	-	180	-	1385	60.0
		d) 4.4	.09	-	145	-	1611	45.2
		e) 4.4	.16	-	135	-	844	60.0
12.	.19	a) 13.9	.19	1.24	-	1409	-	50.0
13.	1.04	a) 9.5	.31	.75	-	523	-	50.0
		b) 9.5	.15	.33	-	446	-	50.0
		c) 9.5	.09	.23	-	552	-	50.0
		d) 9.5	.06	.15	-	540	-	50.0
		e) 13.9	.63	-	1400	-	-	54.6
14.	2.01	a) 3.2	.31	-	1.89*	-	2439*	54.9
		b) 2.5	.31	-	1.89*	-	2439*	54.9
		c) 2.5	1.15	-	2000	-	1724	54.6

* Fixed Kind System

Table 4.26 : Frequency Distribution of Lease Units
According to Regions, Crops and Tenancy
Types (No. of Lease Units)

	Share Cropping	Fixed Kind Rent	Fixed Cash Rent	Total
I. Region :				
Raghuni Dehat	84	-	-	84
Baghnagri	37	-	-	37
Dhina	51	-	-	51
Maina Tanr	13	21	-	34
Biddhipur	42	2	22	67
Total	227	23	22	273
II. Crop :				
Paddy	167	8	2	177
Wheat	16	13	-	29
Sugarcane	6	-	-	6
Jute	6	-	-	6
Tomato	5	2	11	18
Maize	18	-	5	23
Others	8	-	4	12
Total	226	23	22	271
Not Reporting their Crop				2

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

In this study, therefore, we have tried to highlight certain aspects of the relationship between the capitalist mode of production and various pre-capitalist forms of surplus appropriation on the basis of the information collected from the five Bihar Villages. It needs to be mentioned here for the last time that our data are related to five villages only. They have been presented here in simple bivariate relationship without the use of any sophisticated statistical tools. Its purpose is primarily to illustrate our points. In the following lines we have tried to put together the basic arguments of our study thus :

1. Our study of land market shows that the land ownership is highly concentrated. This process of concentration has been achieved through various post-independence legislations relating to land. Also, there have often been outright purchases of land by the landowners. This transfer of land have primarily been from the poor to the big landowners. In many cases these landowners have bought the land already mortgaged to them (often without paying anything) or from those who are otherwise indebted to them. We have also found that the monopoly of land, the most

important conditions of production, is usually associated with the control of other productive forces like seeds, fertilizer and water.

2. All landowning classes except the poorest owners, employ outside labour. They employ both casual labour on the basis of daily wages and attached labourers which are usually employed for long period - usually 5 years or more. All landowners - big and small - employ these attached labourers. But the big landowners employ more than the middle and the small. The big landowners employ mainly for economic reasons : for an assured supply of labour power for various agricultural operations that often have to be completed within a specified time period. For the middle and small peasants the reasons of appointment of attached labourers in our villages are combinations of caste and shortage of family labour because of out-migration from many of these families.

These attached labourers could be found in both developed and underdeveloped regions. But in villages like Dhima where the tractors are being used increasingly in such operations as plough, the character of attached labour - who are primarily employed for ploughing - has changed. Their nature of work is different. The duration of their jobs has become shorter and they are being paid their wages in cash.

The wage basket of the attached labourer is comprised of

land, money (without interest) and daily wages at fixed rates. The big peasants usually pay more money and bigger size of land than the middle and the small. The wages of attached labourers are usually lower than the wages of casual labourers. The wages of the casual labourers itself is not very high. It is lower than the officially prescribed rates of wages. In some areas like Dhima it is high in some agricultural operations like ploughing. This high wages for ploughing is associated with the high cost of tractor operations in Dhima. But in Dhima itself the wages rates for other operations are low.

No formal contract exists between the attached labourer and his employers. The labourer is apparently free to do work in others farm after the completion of his work in his employer's field. But in actual practice they seldom find time to do such work, particularly if his employer happens to be a big peasant. Not only does he has to work in his employer's farm but also he has to perform various types of unpaid labour in his 'malik's' home. The situation is somewhat relaxed if the 'malik' happens to be a middle or a small peasant. The chief mechanism through which these attached labourers are bounded down are the money advanced to them and also, to a certain extent, land. Though no interest is usually charged on this loan, the attached labourer is usually asked to pay the interest along with the original sum advanced if he wants to leave his 'malik' without the consent of the later. The loan amount is kept snowballing by the employer's artifices. And the labourer is compelled to pay the entire amount

by force - the original with the interest-whenver he choses to act on his own volition.

In the lease market our basic problematic was to find out "who leases to whom". We found that the most important groups of lessors are the big peasants who lease out mostly to the poor tenants, either pure tenants, i.e. the landless leasing in land, or small owner tenants, i.e. petty landowners leasing in land. The middle and the poor landowners also lease out land in some situations and they too prefer to lease out to the poor tenants, though occasionally they lease out land to the bigger tenants also.

The big lessors prefer landless and poor peasants as lessees as they provide them with cheap labour either as 'haiwas' (the most popular local name for attached labour) or as casual labour. In many cases the willingness to work as labour in some form in the lessor's farm becomes a pre-condition for giving land to a lessee. For major agricultural operations the lessee is paid. But besides such works, the lessee often has to work in the lessor's home and do many other minor works in his field or in his courtyard - like cleaning lesser's courtyard, repairing 'Bunds' etc. - unpaid. Such forms of unpaid labour are not always so obvious. The middle and the poor lessors prefer poor lessees with implements as the lessors themselves are short of implements and often have to make use of lessee's implements. Those lessors who are widows or who do not stay in the village prefer lessees who pay regularly.

The sharecropping is the most usual form of tenancy in these five villages. In this form of tenancy the landlord's share is traditionally fixed at fifty per cent. The landlord shares everything. But he does not share any part of the cost of production of the lessee. The crop is usually stipulated. In actual practice, the landlord's share is more than fifty per cent as there are many deductions from lessee's share. Such works are not specified. But in cases where the tenants are big or has political backing, or where the lessor is a widow, or he or she stays out, the lessor usually gets not more than 25 per cent of the main crop grown.

In some of the villages the fixed cash system and fixed kind system have appeared side by side with the sharecropping. It is practised in most cases in crops like tomato, 'dhania' 'mirchi' etc. and, in some villages, in HYV wheat. In these forms of tenancies the lessors share part of the lessee's cost of production, particularly the irrigation cost. The gross productivity of the leased land in this forms of tenancies are higher than the sharecropping. But the rents are also high. It, in fact, depends on the bargaining position of the lessee and the lessor. Further, the durations of these leases are shorter the turnover being usually a year. In many cases it is just for one crop period. Thus, whatever the lessees gain in terms of higher productivity is siphoned away by quicker lease turnover and higher rent. The poor lessees are powerless to thwart this ^y sackrenting not only because of their weak economic

position but also because of indebtedness which is a fallout of their poverty again to the lessors. The poor tenants need loan for their survival. Nobody in the village gives him loan except the lessor as the later is sure to get back his money from the crop grown in the land leased out to the lessee. In case the lessee refuses to pay, the lessor has various economic and non-economic means - including force - to squeeze the lessee almost without impunity.

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Schedule - A

I. Identification Particulars

1. Village

3. Head of the Household

2. Block

4. Caste

II. Household Particulars

Name	Age	Sex	Education and Skill	Occupation	Is he fully Employed
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

III. Land Holding

	Inside the Village	Outside the Village
1. Area Owned		
a) Cultivable land		
b) Orchard		
c) Homestead land		
d) Khalihan		
e) Others		
f) Total		
2. Area leased in		
3. Area leased out		
4. Area under usufruct mortgage		
5. Are there attached labourers to the household		
6. Does it own a pumpset		
7. Does it own a tractor		

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SCHEDULE B : LANDOWNERS

1. Land

- 1.1 Land cultivated :
- 1.2 Land kept fallow :
- 1.3 Single cropped area :
- 1.4 Double cropped area :
- 1.5 Multiple cropped area :

2. Irrigation

Source	Area irri- gated	Govern- ment*	Priva- te*	Water Charges	Do you have to pay anything extra. If yes, how much? (Rs)
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					

* Mark the relevant place

3. Livestock

Sl. No.	Type	Numbers	Prices per unit	When purchased
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				

4. Inputs

4.1 Seeds

Crop	Seeds used	Total bought 'bora'	Qntty. (in Kg.)	Qntty. of seeds per 'bora'	Qntty. of seeds used in the current year	Official price of seeds	Actual price at which bought
------	------------	---------------------	-----------------	----------------------------	--	-------------------------	------------------------------

4.2 Fertiliser

Crop	Name of fertilisers used	Qntty. bought (total kg./bora)	If in bora, qntty./bora	Qntty. used in the current year	Offi- cial rate	Rate of which bought	From whom bought
------	--------------------------	--------------------------------	-------------------------	---------------------------------	-----------------	----------------------	------------------

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

4.3 Pesticides

Crop	Name of the pesticides used	Qntty. bought	If in bora qntty. per bora	Qntty. used in the current year	Offi- cial rate	Rate of which bought	From whom bought
------	-----------------------------	---------------	----------------------------	---------------------------------	-----------------	----------------------	------------------

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

5. Agricultural Implements

Type	Nos.	Numbers Purchased			Approximate value in Rs./ piece
		Current year	Last year	Within 5 years	
1. Plough					
2. Cart					
3. Other minor implements					
4. Tractors					
5. Pumping sets					
6.					
7.					

6. Crops grown

1. Area
2. Total production
3. Amount consumed at home
4. Amount marketed
5. Kept for seed
6. Paid as wages
7. Paid as seed advance
8. Received as rent
9. Received as payment of seed advanced earlier

7.1 If landowner has permanent labour, give the following details:

No.	Labour's Name	Labourers Caste	For how many years he is working and year the con- tract was make	Type of work done*		For how many hr a day he works	
				At home	At field	At home	In field

7.2 Mode of payment of permanent labour

Nos.	Name	Payment in		Land given as Wages (Acres)	Land given in lease (Acres)
		Cash	Kind		

7.3 Does he take any share of the crop from land given as part of wages to the permanent labourers?

Yes ☐ No ☐

7.4 Does he allow the permanent labourers to work in others field?

Yes ☐ No ☐

7.5 If yes, which time of the year he is allowed to work?

7.6 Do you provide any inputs to the permanent labour for cultivation purpose?

Yes ☐ No ☐

7.7 Do you have any formal contract with the permanent labourers?

Yes ☐ No ☐

7.8 If yes, give the format (If no, find out whether they had any formal contract earlier and, if he had any such contract, when it was discontinued and what was the format. Use a separate sheet here, if necessary)

8. Wage Rate

Give the following details of wages paid to daily labour/casual labour

No.	Operation	Crop	Male				Female			
			Cash	Kind	Break-fast	Meal	Cash	Kind	Break-fast	Meal

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Schedule C : Labourers and Tenants

1. Identification Particulars

1.1 Village

1.2 Block

1.3 Head of the household

1.4 Caste

2. Wage Rate

No.	Agricultural Operations	Sex	Daily hours of work	Kharif			Break fast	Rabi			Br ak fa st
				Cash	Kind	Meals		Cash	Kind	Meals	
1.		M									
		F									
2.		M									
		F									
3.		M									
		F									
4.		M									
		F									
5.		M									
		F									
6.		M									
		F									
7.		M									
		F									

2.2 Do you also do any non-agricultural work? If yes, give details:

No.	Type of work and place of work	Month of work	No. of days	Wage rate
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				

3. Details about permanent labour;

3.1 Do you have any formal contract with your employer at present?

Yes/No

3.2 If ~~yes~~ no, what was the arrangement in the past? If there was any formal contract in the past, what was the form of that contract?

3.3 How long you are working as permanent labourers with the present employer?

3.4 What was the name of the earlier employer (or employers)?

3.5 If he is a permanent labour then take the following about his wages:

No.	Operation	Wage rate*			Other facilities			
		Cash	Kind	Meals Break- fast	Cloth- ing	Khaini	Bidi	Others
1.								
2.								
3.								
4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								

* Ask separately for each crop and if the wage rate is separate for separate crop then note separately for each one of them in the above form using a separate sheet of paper.

3.6 When your wages are paid? 1. Daily 2. Weekly 3. Monthly
4. Annually

3.7 How many hours a day you have to work.

3.8 Do you also have to do domestic work at your employers' home? (Find out the nature of that work).

3.9 Do you get any land from your employer as part of your wages? (Check whether this land is separate from land leased in by the respondent from the same employer)

Yes/No

If yes, give the following details:

Plot	Year	Irrigation*	Current Year		
			Crop	Production (Total)	Landlords share

* Use the code given in Q.4 later in the schedule

3.10 Does your employer share the input cost? Yes/No

3.11 If yes, give the following details:

No.	Item shared	Quantity When taken taken	Quantity returned		When retu- rned
			Cash	Kind	

3.12 Have you leased in any land from your employer apart from the land given to you as part of your wages? Yes/No

3.13 Have you leased in land from any other person or persons? (If yes, take information about that as performa given in Q.4 in the schedule)

3.14 Have you taken any money or grain from your employer? Yes/No

3.15 If yes, mention the amount of money/ quantity of grain and the time when taken.

3.16 Did you take it as advance against your wages or as loan? (Mark the appropriate item) a) Part of wage
b) Separate loan

3.17 If it is a loan, have you returned it and when? Take the amount of money/ quantity of grain and the period when returned.

- 3.18 Did you pay any time any portion
or whole your grain loan in cash? Yes/No
- 3.19 If yes, give the following details
about that specific loan/loans paid
in cash:
- i. Quantity of grain taken as loan.
 - ii. When the loan was taken?
 - iii. Prices of grain at the time of loan
 - iv. How much of the grain returned in
cash and time of return?
 - v. What was the prices of grain at that time?
- 3.20 If it is a cash loan, what is the rate of
interest?
- 3.21 Is the interest deducted at the time of
payment of loan? Yes/No
- 3.22 Do you take loan from any person other
than your present employer? If yes,
give these details:
- i. Lender's name
 - ii. Amount taken
 - iii. Interest rate
 - iv. Amount returned
- 3.23 Is the interest deducted at the time of
taking the loan? Yes/No
- 3.24 Do you have to do any work in money-lend-
ers field or house or in any other place,
e.g. shop etc.? Yes/No
- 3.25 Are you allowed by your present employer
to go anywhere or accept any other job
during the tenure of your present employ-
ment? Yes/No
- 3.26 If you want to leave the job what are the
terms of your release? Do you have to pay
back your (production and consumption)
loan?
- 3.27 Do you have to pay anything other than the
repayment of loans and advances? If yes,
briefly describe that. Yes/No
- 3.28 What other jobs available in your locality?
Mention whether it is agricultural/non-agri-
cultural or government job and their wage
rates.

4. Leasing of Land

Sl. No.	Plot & Area of each plot	Irrigated/ Non-irrigated*	Landlords' name	Year of plot leased in	Current Year				Last year			
					Crops grown in the plot	Landlords share of main crop	Landlords share of subsidiary crop	Landlords share of hays, etc.	Crops grown in the plot	Landlords share of main crop	Landlords share of subsidiary crop	Landlords share of hays, etc.

* Mention the sources of irrigation using the following code :

C - Canal; P - Pumpsets (private); GP - Government Pumpsets;
W - Well; TB - Tubewell

4.1 Do your landlords stipulate what crops to be produced

a. Yes/No

b. In some plots (take the plot numbers)

4.2 How the rent is paid?

Plot No.

Crop

Rate

a) Crop shared

b) Fixed kind rent

c) Fixed cash rent

4.3 When the payment is made? (Take the details about the plot)

Share-cropping

Fixed cash

Fixed kind

a) Before harvest

b) During harvest

c) After harvest

4.4 How long sharecropping is prevalent in your village?

4.5 When fixed cash system and fixed kind system were introduced?

4.6 Have the later types started with the introduction of any particular crop? If yes, what is that crop?

4.7 Do you share subsidiary crop also?

Yes/No

4.8 Do your landlord share input cost?
If yes, give plot-wise details:

Plot/ Area	Seeds		Fertiliser		Pesticides		Plough		Bullock/Ox	
	Taken	Retu- rned	Taken	Retu- rned	Taken	Retu- rned	Taken	Retu- rned	Taken	Returned

4.9 When this cost sharing started?

4.10 Has it started with the introduction
of any particular crop : If yes, what is
that crop?

4.11 Have you taken any loan (cash or grain) from
your landlord or any other person? If yes,
how they have been repaid?

Money lenders name	Loan	Purpose of loan	Rate of interest	Loan repaid
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4.12 Do you have to pay interest to your
landlord?

Yes/No

4.13 If yes, give the rate?

4.14 Do you have to work in landlords land
or at this home?

Yes/No

4.15 If yes, give details : type, season,
days of work and wage (if any).

1. Type of work
2. Season of work
3. Wage rate

4.16 Do your landlord make any stipulation
about selling of your crops?

Yes/No

4.17 If yes, whom you are asked to sell?

What is his connection with the landlord?

4.18 Give the following details about your grain sold

Crop	S o l d		
	Immediately After harvest	Between first and third month after the harvest	After the third month of the harvest

4.19 If the grains are to be carted to the buyer depot, shop or to the market yard who bears the cost?

5. Tenants perception about landlords

5.1 Does he/they have any preference about tenants

Yes/No

5.2 If yes, why? Tick the appropriate number.

- a. Preference for small/marginal/middle/big tenants
- b. Preference for farmers with implements
- c. Preference for farmers who pay regularly
- d. Preference for cost.

5.3 Why your landlord is leasing out land? Mark out the appropriate reason from the list.

- a. More paying to lease out
- b. Not sufficient manpower in the family
- c. Financially difficult to carry out family cultivation
- d. The plot is away from residence
- e. No farming experience
- f. Traditionally a landlord (caste)
- g. Physically handicapped or a widow or child
- h. Engaged in business/service
- i. Other reason

5.4 If you have money for investment where would you invest?

- a. In own land
- b. In lease in land